SQL injection vulnerabilities arise when user-controllable data is incorporated into database SQL queries in an unsafe manner. An attacker can supply crafted input to break out of the data context in which their input appears and interfere with the structure of the surrounding query.
Various attacks can be delivered via SQL injection, including reading or modifying critical application data, interfering with application logic, escalating privileges within the database and executing operating system commands.
Issue remediation
The most effective way to prevent SQL injection attacks is to use parameterised queries (also known as prepared statements) for all database access. This method uses two steps to incorporate potentially tainted data into SQL queries: first, the application specifies the structure of the query, leaving placeholders for each item of user input; second, the application specifies the contents of each placeholder. Because the structure of the query has already defined in the first step, it is not possible for malformed data in the second step to interfere with the query structure. You should review the documentation for your database and application platform to determine the appropriate APIs which you can use to perform parameterised queries. It is strongly recommended that you parameterise every variable data item that is incorporated into database queries, even if it is not obviously tainted, to prevent oversights occurring and avoid vulnerabilities being introduced by changes elsewhere within the code base of the application.
You should be aware that some commonly employed and recommended mitigations for SQL injection vulnerabilities are not always effective:
One common defence is to double up any single quotation marks appearing within user input before incorporating that input into a SQL query. This defence is designed to prevent malformed data from terminating the string in which it is inserted. However, if the data being incorporated into queries is numeric, then the defence may fail, because numeric data may not be encapsulated within quotes, in which case only a space is required to break out of the data context and interfere with the query. Further, in second-order SQL injection attacks, data that has been safely escaped when initially inserted into the database is subsequently read from the database and then passed back to it again. Quotation marks that have been doubled up initially will return to their original form when the data is reused, allowing the defence to be bypassed.
Another often cited defence is to use stored procedures for database access. While stored procedures can provide security benefits, they are not guaranteed to prevent SQL injection attacks. The same kinds of vulnerabilities that arise within standard dynamic SQL queries can arise if any SQL is dynamically constructed within stored procedures. Further, even if the procedure is sound, SQL injection can arise if the procedure is invoked in an unsafe manner using user-controllable data.
The REST URL parameter 3 appears to be vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. The payloads 35525155'%20or%201%3d1--%20 and 35525155'%20or%201%3d2--%20 were each submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. These two requests resulted in different responses, indicating that the input is being incorporated into a SQL query in an unsafe way.
Note that automated difference-based tests for SQL injection flaws can often be unreliable and are prone to false positive results. You should manually review the reported requests and responses to confirm whether a vulnerability is actually present.
The s_sq cookie appears to be vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. The payloads 64212002'%20or%201%3d1--%20 and 64212002'%20or%201%3d2--%20 were each submitted in the s_sq cookie. These two requests resulted in different responses, indicating that the input is being incorporated into a SQL query in an unsafe way.
Note that automated difference-based tests for SQL injection flaws can often be unreliable and are prone to false positive results. You should manually review the reported requests and responses to confirm whether a vulnerability is actually present.
<!-- main calendar program --> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.dominionenterprises.com/site/scripts/jscalendar-1.0/calendar.js"></script> <!-- language for the calendar --> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.dominionenterprises.com/site/scripts/jscalendar-1.0/lang/calendar-en.js"></script> <!-- the following script defines the Calendar.setup helper function, ...[SNIP]...
<!-- main calendar program --> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.dominionenterprises.com/site/scripts/jscalendar-1.0/calendar.js"></script> <!-- language for the calendar --> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.dominionenterprises.com/site/scripts/jscalendar-1.0/lang/calendar-en.js"></script> <!-- the following script defines the Calendar.setup helper function, which makes adding a calendar a matter of 1 or 2 lines of code. --> <script type="text/javascript ...[SNIP]...
The REST URL parameter 3 appears to be vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. The payloads 72254876'%20or%201%3d1--%20 and 72254876'%20or%201%3d2--%20 were each submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. These two requests resulted in different responses, indicating that the input is being incorporated into a SQL query in an unsafe way.
Note that automated difference-based tests for SQL injection flaws can often be unreliable and are prone to false positive results. You should manually review the reported requests and responses to confirm whether a vulnerability is actually present.
The Referer HTTP header appears to be vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. The payloads 12491798'%20or%201%3d1--%20 and 12491798'%20or%201%3d2--%20 were each submitted in the Referer HTTP header. These two requests resulted in different responses, indicating that the input is being incorporated into a SQL query in an unsafe way.
Note that automated difference-based tests for SQL injection flaws can often be unreliable and are prone to false positive results. You should manually review the reported requests and responses to confirm whether a vulnerability is actually present.
<!-- main calendar program --> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.dominionenterprises.com/site/scripts/jscalendar-1.0/calendar.js"></script> <!-- language for the calendar --> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.dominionenterprises.com/site/scripts/jscalendar-1.0/lang/calendar-en.js"></script> <!-- the following script defines the Calendar.setup helper function, which makes adding a calendar a matter of 1 or 2 lines o ...[SNIP]...
<!-- main calendar program --> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.dominionenterprises.com/site/scripts/jscalendar-1.0/calendar.js"></script> <!-- language for the calendar --> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.dominionenterprises.com/site/scripts/jscalendar-1.0/lang/calendar-en.js"></script> <!-- the following script defines the Calendar.setup helper function, which makes adding a calendar a matter of 1 or 2 lines of code. --> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.dominionenterprises.com/site/scripts/js ...[SNIP]...
The s_cc cookie appears to be vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. The payloads 62583083'%20or%201%3d1--%20 and 62583083'%20or%201%3d2--%20 were each submitted in the s_cc cookie. These two requests resulted in different responses, indicating that the input is being incorporated into a SQL query in an unsafe way.
Note that automated difference-based tests for SQL injection flaws can often be unreliable and are prone to false positive results. You should manually review the reported requests and responses to confirm whether a vulnerability is actually present.
<!-- main calendar program --> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.dominionenterprises.com/site/scripts/jscalendar-1.0/calendar.js"></script> <!-- language for the calendar --> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.dominionenterprises.com/site/scripts/jscalendar-1.0/lang/calendar-en.js"></script> <!-- the following script defines the Calendar.setup helper function, which makes adding a calendar a matter of 1 or 2 lines o ...[SNIP]...
<!-- main calendar program --> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.dominionenterprises.com/site/scripts/jscalendar-1.0/calendar.js"></script> <!-- language for the calendar --> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.dominionenterprises.com/site/scripts/jscalendar-1.0/lang/calendar-en.js"></script> <!-- the following script defines the Calendar.setup helper function, which makes adding a calendar a matter of 1 or 2 lines of code. --> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.dominionenterprises.com/site/scripts/js ...[SNIP]...
The REST URL parameter 3 appears to be vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. The payloads 16640137'%20or%201%3d1--%20 and 16640137'%20or%201%3d2--%20 were each submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. These two requests resulted in different responses, indicating that the input is being incorporated into a SQL query in an unsafe way.
Note that automated difference-based tests for SQL injection flaws can often be unreliable and are prone to false positive results. You should manually review the reported requests and responses to confirm whether a vulnerability is actually present.
The REST URL parameter 3 appears to be vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. The payloads 48717636'%20or%201%3d1--%20 and 48717636'%20or%201%3d2--%20 were each submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. These two requests resulted in different responses, indicating that the input is being incorporated into a SQL query in an unsafe way.
Note that automated difference-based tests for SQL injection flaws can often be unreliable and are prone to false positive results. You should manually review the reported requests and responses to confirm whether a vulnerability is actually present.
The REST URL parameter 3 appears to be vulnerable to LDAP injection attacks.
The payloads *)(sn=* and *)!(sn=* were each submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. These two requests resulted in different responses, indicating that the input may be being incorporated into a conjunctive LDAP query in an unsafe manner.
Issue background
LDAP injection arises when user-controllable data is copied in an unsafe way into an LDAP query that is performed by the application. If an attacker can inject LDAP metacharacters into the query, then they can interfere with the query's logic. Depending on the function for which the query is used, the attacker may be able to retrieve sensitive data to which they are not authorised, or subvert the application's logic to perform some unauthorised action.
Note that automated difference-based tests for LDAP injection flaws can often be unreliable and are prone to false positive results. You should manually review the reported requests and responses to confirm whether a vulnerability is actually present.
Issue remediation
If possible, applications should avoid copying user-controllable data into LDAP queries. If this is unavoidable, then the data should be strictly validated to prevent LDAP injection attacks. In most situations, it will be appropriate to allow only short alphanumeric strings to be copied into queries, and any other input should be rejected. At a minimum, input containing any LDAP metacharacters should be rejected; characters that should be blocked include ( ) ; , * | & = and whitespace.
Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Remediation background
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the img request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 239be"%3balert(1)//e2bc96337d2 was submitted in the img parameter. This input was echoed as 239be";alert(1)//e2bc96337d2 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /ClickContact/js.ashx?Agent=950b13d4-72fe-46ca-891d-8922b0525b3e&img=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dhmiservices.com%2FImageHandler.ashx%3Fimg_id%3D3824239be"%3balert(1)//e2bc96337d2 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.dhmiservices.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.agentadvantage.com/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.24 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/11.0.696.60 Safari/534.24 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Fri, 06 May 2011 18:40:49 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 653 Set-Cookie: BIGipServerdhmweb_http_pool=2237947146.20480.0000; expires=Fri, 06-May-2011 20:40:49 GMT; path=/
function load2058797069() { var load = window.open('http://950b13d4-72fe-46ca-891d-8922b0525b3e.dhmiservices.com/ClickContact/popup.aspx?var1=950b13d4- ...[SNIP]... <img src=\"http://www.dhmiservices.com/ImageHandler.ashx?img_id=3824239be";alert(1)//e2bc96337d2\" border=\"0\" alt=\"Click to Call\"/> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the img_id request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload e1fbf<script>alert(1)</script>cf716ce4fbd was submitted in the img_id parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /ImageHandler.ashx?img_id=3824e1fbf<script>alert(1)</script>cf716ce4fbd HTTP/1.1 Host: www.dhmiservices.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.agentadvantage.com/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.24 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/11.0.696.60 Safari/534.24 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Fri, 06 May 2011 18:40:26 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 118 Set-Cookie: BIGipServerdhmweb_http_pool=2237947146.20480.0000; expires=Fri, 06-May-2011 20:40:26 GMT; path=/
Conversion failed when converting the nvarchar value '3824e1fbf<script>alert(1)</script>cf716ce4fbd' to data type int.
The value of REST URL parameter 7 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload bde62"><a>f053602bd88 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 7. This input was echoed as bde62\"><a>f053602bd88 in the application's response.
This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to inject new HTML tags into the returned document. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.
The value of REST URL parameter 7 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 7db69<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>eafdbdd941c was submitted in the REST URL parameter 7. This input was echoed as 7db69<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>eafdbdd941c in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
The highlighted cookie appears to contain a session token, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"><html> <head> <title>Dominion Enterprises | Advertising User Agreement</title> <base href="http://www.dominionenterprises.com/" />
The highlighted cookie appears to contain a session token, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Request
GET /ClickContact/js.ashx?Agent=950b13d4-72fe-46ca-891d-8922b0525b3e&img=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dhmiservices.com%2FImageHandler.ashx%3Fimg_id%3D3824 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.dhmiservices.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.agentadvantage.com/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.24 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/11.0.696.60 Safari/534.24 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Fri, 06 May 2011 18:39:55 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 623 Set-Cookie: BIGipServerdhmweb_http_pool=2237947146.20480.0000; expires=Fri, 06-May-2011 20:39:55 GMT; path=/
function load565509113() { var load = window.open('http://950b13d4-72fe-46ca-891d-8922b0525b3e.dhmiservices.com/ClickContact/popup.aspx?var1=950b13d4-7 ...[SNIP]...
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Request
GET /ImageHandler.ashx?img_id=3824 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.dhmiservices.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.agentadvantage.com/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.24 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/11.0.696.60 Safari/534.24 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Fri, 06 May 2011 18:40:12 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: image/png Content-Length: 5783 Set-Cookie: BIGipServerdhmweb_http_pool=2237947146.20480.0000; expires=Fri, 06-May-2011 20:40:12 GMT; path=/
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Request
GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1 Host: www.dhmiservices.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.24 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/11.0.696.60 Safari/534.24 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 11246 Content-Type: image/x-icon Last-Modified: Wed, 05 Dec 2007 16:04:38 GMT Accept-Ranges: bytes ETag: "06f49895837c81:45c2" Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Fri, 06 May 2011 18:41:31 GMT Set-Cookie: BIGipServerdhmweb_http_pool=2237947146.20480.0000; expires=Fri, 06-May-2011 20:41:31 GMT; path=/
ASP.NET debugging is enabled on the server. The user context used to scan the application does not appear to be permitted to perform debugging, so this is not an immediately exploitable issue. However, if you were able to obtain or guess appropriate platform-level credentials, you may be able to perform debugging.
Issue background
ASP.NET allows remote debugging of web applications, if configured to do so. By default, debugging is subject to access control and requires platform-level authentication.
If an attacker can successfully start a remote debugging session, this is likely to disclose sensitive information about the web application and supporting infrastructure which may be valuable in formulating targetted attacks against the system.
Issue remediation
To disable debugging, open the Web.config file for the application, and find the <compilation> element within the <system.web> section. Set the debug attribute to "false". Note that it is also possible to enable debugging for all applications within the Machine.config file. You should confirm that debug attribute in the <compilation> element has not been set to "true" within the Machine.config file also.
It is strongly recommended that you refer to your platform's documentation relating to this issue, and do not rely solely on the above remediation.
The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.
However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.
Issue remediation
You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).
If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.
In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.
The response contains the following Content-type statement:
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
The response states that it contains plain text. However, it actually appears to contain script.
Request
GET /ClickContact/js.ashx?Agent=950b13d4-72fe-46ca-891d-8922b0525b3e&img=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dhmiservices.com%2FImageHandler.ashx%3Fimg_id%3D3824 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.dhmiservices.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.agentadvantage.com/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.24 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/11.0.696.60 Safari/534.24 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Fri, 06 May 2011 18:39:55 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 623 Set-Cookie: BIGipServerdhmweb_http_pool=2237947146.20480.0000; expires=Fri, 06-May-2011 20:39:55 GMT; path=/
function load565509113() { var load = window.open('http://950b13d4-72fe-46ca-891d-8922b0525b3e.dhmiservices.com/ClickContact/popup.aspx?var1=950b13d4-7 ...[SNIP]...